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M&A FIDUCIARY DUTIES: DELAWARE’S MURKY JURISPRUDENCE
DANIEL J. MORRISSEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
MERGERS and Acquisitions have become the endgame in corporatepractice,1 with one textbook calling them the “sexiest topic”2 in that
area of law.  They have also been heralded as “one of the most important
corporate-level strategies in the new millennium.”3  Entire businesses be-
come objects of commerce4 and, just like other pieces of property in a
market economy,5 trade freely among those who place different values on
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dedicated to two lovely ladies, the author’s aunts Frances and Ramona Carroll.
The author wishes to thank Professors Marc Steinberg, Lynn Daggett, Megan
Ballard, friends from practice Mike Liles and Dean Little, and student assistants
Lin Sun, Dan Rosenbaum, Lisa Whyatt, and Greg Morrissey, and faculty assistant
Vicky Daniels for their helpful comments.
1. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATIONS LAW 661 (2d ed. 2010).  As one au-
thor put it: “[t]here is no more complicated transaction than a merger or acquisi-
tion.  The various issues raised are broad and complex, from valuation and deal
structure to tax and securities laws.” ANDREW J. SHERMAN, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
FROM A TO Z xiii (3d ed. 2010).
For more on the complicated nature of this process, both in its business and
legal aspects, see WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 965 (7th ed. 2012)
and THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES (3d ed. 2009).
2. ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY AP-
PROACH 895 (2010).
3. MICHAEL A. HITT, JEFFREY HARRISON & R. DUANE IRELAND, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING VALUE FOR STAKEHOLDERS ix (2001).  Like the
economy, M&A is a global phenomenon.  A recent Wall Street Journal series, The
New M&A: National Icons, Foreign Owners, highlighted a trend there.  The accompa-
nying stories described the purchase of a famous U.K. cereal maker Weetabix by
the Chinese firm, Bright Food Group, and the acquisition of a controlling position
in Avotvz, the struggling Russian automaker, by Renault and Nissan.  Laurie
Burkitt, The New M&A: National Icons, Foreign Owned: Chinese Food Company Eats
English Breakfast, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2012, at B1; Ira Iosebashvili, The New M&A:
National Icons, Foreign Owned: Renault-Nissan Buy Into Russia’s Aged Auto Giant, WALL
ST. J., May 4, 2012, at B1.
4. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COM-
PANIES 997 (11th ed. 2010).
5. A key issue, as in all market transactions, is how much the buyer is willing
to pay.  Purchasers, therefore, often seek the advice of investment bankers on the
financial value of the firms they want to acquire. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 1,
at 647. But see infra notes 310–55 and accompanying text on recent cases involving
double-dealing by those financiers.
Money of course, is not the only consideration in much of our decision-mak-
ing. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MAR-
KETS (2012).  That is a value to keep in mind, given the human costs of some of
(121)
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their productive uses.6  These changes of corporate control are crucial
events in the lives of companies and their employees, often carried out in
dramatic fashion “with high-powered take-over ploys and ingenious defen-
sive gambits.”7
Beginning in the 1960s, when mergers and acquisitions first became a
major factor in the economy, commentators have engaged in lengthy de-
bates about their overall value to society.8  One study by a leading account-
ing firm found that eighty-three percent of them fail to produce any
benefit for their shareholders and over half actually destroy value.9  Work-
these deals in things like worker displacement and their negative impact on com-
munities. See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
6. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 957 (7th ed. 2008).  As one author com-
mented on the motives of acquisitions: “[s]easoned executives and entrepreneurs
have always searched for efficient and profitable ways to increase revenues and
gain market share.” SHERMAN, supra note 1, at 1.  One distinguished author gives
this description of the economic motivation of the buying firm: “[t]he decision to
invest rests upon the expectation that the future returns to existing shareholders,
discounted to present value at a rate which reflects the risks, will exceed the
amount presently invested.” BRATTON, supra note 1, at 965.  Correspondingly, he
says this of the seller’s interests: “From the point of view of the acquired corpora-
tion, the initial inquiry also concerns . . . whether enough is being received for the
value given up . . . and whether synergistic or other gains are being appropriately
divided.” Id. at 966.  A more jaundiced view of mergers and acquisitions holds that
they are empire-building exercises benefiting only the managers of bidding com-
panies.  Dean Clark thus described the questionable desires that may drive those
decisions: “As bosses of bigger companies, they will acquire greater power and
prestige.  Perhaps they expect to obtain greater executive compensation, another
often alleged correlative of company size.” ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 537
(1986).
7. PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 2, at 895.  Delaware case law provides
good descriptions of those anti-takeover moves as they have evolved. See infra notes
151–236 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 135–47 and accompanying text; see also Richard E. Caves,
Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Economy, in 31 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
BOSTON CONFERENCE SERIES 149–72 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren eds.,
1987), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf31/conf31f.pdf;
Devra Golbe & Lawrence J. White, Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy: An
Aggregate and Historical Overview, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 25–48 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1987), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5820.pdf.
For more recent comment on the questionable efficacy of certain mergers, see
Andrew Sorkin, AT&T to Buy T-Mobile USA for $39 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/att-to-buy-t-mobile-usa-for-39-
billion/ and Nicholas Jackson, Maybe a Second AOL-Time Warner Marriage Would
Work Better, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technol-
ogy/archive/2011/08/maybe-a-second-aol-time-warner-marriage-would-work-bet-
ter/243430/.
9. KPMG, UNLOCKING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE KEY TO SUCCESS 2 (1999),
available at http://www.imaa-institute.org/docs/m&a/kpmg_01_Unlocking%20
Shareholder%20Value%20-%20The%20Keys%20to%20Success.pdf.  An earlier
study from the 1980s also questioned whether wealth gains came from hostile take-
overs.  Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2342, 1987), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2342.pdf.
2
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ers at target firms are impacted most immediately—often with lay-offs
and force reductions.10  On the other hand, top management, board
members, and bankers are substantially enriched by them.11  This
has led to periodic calls that mergers and acquisitions should only
be allowed if they can be shown to benefit society as a whole.12  But
despite continuing controversy,13 these gigantic corporate deals
10. See Sheryl R. Tynes, The Walking Wounded: Employees’ Perspectives on Mergers
and Acquisitions, 67 SOC. INQUIRY 299 (1997).  The recent Stanley-Black & Decker
merger of two long-established companies is a good recent example.  Lorraine
Mirabella & Gus G. Sentementes, A Md. Company Fades into Future, BALT. SUN (Mar.
14, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-03-14/business/bal-bz.black
decker14mar14_1_stanley-black-decker-decker-employees-towson-based-black.  In
that $4.5 billion deal 4,000 workers were laid off worldwide, 250 from Black &
Decker’s corporate headquarters. Id.  The transaction, however, paid off hand-
somely for Black & Decker’s CEO who is scheduled to receive $89 million in total
compensation over three years. Id.  For recent comment on a related subject, see
Daniel Indiviglio, Why Are Companies Acquiring Instead of Hiring?, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/08/why-are-
companies-acquiring-instead-of-hiring/61941/.
11. The take-over phenomenon over the last several decades has contributed
to the rising income inequality in our country.  G. William Domhoff, Who Rules
America? SOCIOLOGY (May 2, 2011), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/
power/wealth.html.  As of 2007, the top 1% owned 34.6% of America’s assets and
the next 19% owned 50.5% of them. Id.  Just 1/5 of our citizens controlled over
85% of its wealth. Id.  Most of the income gains during the last several decades
were by corporate executives and financiers.  Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay,
Rich Pull Away from Rest of America, WASH. POST (June 18, 2011), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-executive-pay-rich-pull-away-from-rest-of-
america/2011/06/13/AGKG9jaH_story.html.
12. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Safeguarding the Public Interest in Leveraged Buyouts,
69 OR. L. REV. 47, 82–84 (1990).
13. The 2012 presidential candidacy of Mitt Romney made this an even more
prominent issue.  Romney claimed that he created over 100,000 jobs through com-
panies he helped grow while a principal at the private equity firm, Bain Capital.  At
some companies that Bain Capital bought and sold, however, the workforces were
reduced through downsizing or were totally eliminated when the firms went bank-
rupt.  The jobs that were lost as a result of those deals were much better compen-
sated than the ones that replaced them.  Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bain, Barack and
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A25. But see Kimberly A. Strassel, Vampire Capital-
ism? Please, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2012) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052702303360504577410573651845802.html (discussing Kansas City steel com-
pany acquired by Bain that is featured in Obama television ad critical of Romney).
The company eventually went bankrupt but the piece argues that Bain actually
rescued the company by infusing new capital into it. Id.  It was then profitable for
several years until it became a victim of international competition. Id.  For the
author’s recent views on how President Obama’s reelection may impact this area of
corporate law, see Daniel J. Morrissey, A new Corporate Model, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 7,
2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202583322316.
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have come in waves14 and remain a dominant part of today’s business
world.15
Mergers and Acquisitions can be accomplished in several different
ways—generally either by friendly16 or hostile purchases17 of the shares of
a target company, or by buying its assets.18  The way they are accomplished
14. Before now, the most recent merger surges have been in the 1980s when
many were hostile acquisitions in the oil and gas, banking, and pharmaceutical
industries and in the mid to late 1990s when many were inspired by globalization,
deregulation, and telecommunications. History of Mergers and Acquisitions, ECON-
OMY WATCH (July 17, 2010).  The former were funded by debt, the notorious junk
bonds, while the latter involved mostly equity financing, the so-called “private eq-
uity” deals. Id.  Another author gave this vivid description of those waves:
The 1980s featured swashbucklers and the use of aggressive tactics to
gain control over targets.  The 1990s were equally dynamic in terms of
companies evolving through upsizing and growth, downsizing, rollups,
divestitures, and consolidation, but focused on operations synergies, scale
efficiencies, increases in customer bases, strategic alliances, market share,
and access to new technologies.  This period, however, came to a crashing
end with the bursting of the tech bubble and the global recession that
followed.
SHERMAN, supra note 1, at xii. See also BRATTON, supra note 1, at 971–73.
15. See BRATTON, supra note 1, at 972–73.  The 1990s merger wave subsided
when the high-tech market went bust in 2000. Id.  It picked up in late 2003, only to
crest in 2006 and then fall flat again with the 2008 financial meltdown. Id.  Recov-
ery began in 2010. Id.
A study found that $2.25 trillion changed hands globally in merger and acqui-
sition activity in 2010, the highest since 2007.  Quentin Webb & Denny Thomas,
M&A Tops $2.2 Trillion in First Yearly Rise Since 2007, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/us-deals-idUSTRE6BG00D201012
17.  In 2011, the value of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. topped $1 trillion—
the highest since 2008 and a fifteen percent increase over 2010.  With much cash
on hand and favorable interest rates, experts expected even more activity in 2012.
Tiffany Hsu, Merger and Acquisition Deals Expected to Increase in 2012, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/01/business/la-fi-mo-
merger-acquisition-deals-20120301.
16. There, the target’s board and management are receptive to the takeover
and recommend shareholder approval.  Usually the acquiring company offers the
target’s shareholders a premium over the current price of their shares. DONALD
DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES 740
(5th ed. 2009).  The corporate statutes of various states establish procedures for
these combinations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–66 (2010); see also HA-
ZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 1, at 651–55.
17. This occurs when a bidder’s initial approach to purchase a company is
unsolicited and unwelcome by the target’s management. DEPAMHPLILIS, supra note
16.  It therefore contests the takeover. Id.  The bidder then seeks to circumvent
management and achieve control by acquiring more than half of the target’s
shares. Id.  It may make a direct offer of cash or stock for them (a hostile tender
offer) or it may buy shares in a public stock exchange (an open market purchase).
Id.
18. This involves the purchase of the selling company’s property—facilities,
vehicles, equipment, stock, and inventory. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2170
(2012).  One important difference between an asset acquisition and a stock
purchase is that in the former the buyer can specify the liabilities it is willing to
assume and leave others behind. Id.  In the latter, however, the consolidated com-
pany will assume all the selling company’s obligations. Id.
4
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can present major issues of fairness and conflicts of interest.  This is partic-
ularly true when public companies are put into play, either voluntarily or
involuntarily.19  With such high dollar figures involved, the wealth of those
firms is ripe for misappropriation through abusive tactics.  This may be
truer today than ever in an era of recurrent corporate scandals20 and exor-
bitant executive compensation.21  A Goldman Sachs executive recently
called the Wall Street culture “as toxic and destructive as I have ever seen
it.”22
Occasions for such wrongdoing exist most prominently in public com-
panies because control of those enterprises is separated from their owner-
ship.23  There, a board of directors is empowered to manage the business
for the numerous and widely scattered shareholders who have the ultimate
claim on its worth.24  This has given management (the officers and direc-
tors) and their allies (bankers, lawyers, analysts, accountants, etc.) a great
opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the shareholders and
19. See infra notes 270–355 and accompanying text.
20. For a fine summary of that corruption over the last several decades, see M.
Thomas Arnold, “It’s De´ja` vu All Over Again,” Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage Gate-
keeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 420–24 (2010) (summarizing corporate corrup-
tion over last several decades).  Right after the financial meltdown of 2008, one
respected commentator called the last decade: “an era of rapacious capitalists and
heedless self-indulgence.”  Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Rabbit Ragu Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at WK8.
Numerous accounting scandals, Madoff-like frauds, and ingenious corporate
malfeasance like options backdating resulted from that attitude.  For the author’s
take on that rampant wrongdoing, see Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation
After the Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531 (2012) and Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path
of Corporate Law: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment
Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 973 (2007).
21. While the average American worker earned $46,742 in 2010, the mean
compensation of S&P CEOs was $12 million.  Gary Strauss, Stock Options Help CEOs
Cash In, USA TODAY (July 10, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/NEWS/usa
edition/2011-07-08-ceopay_ST_U.htm.  The perceived injustice of that disparity
helped fuel the Occupy Wall Street movement in fall, 2011.  George Packer, All the
Angry People, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2011, at 32.
22. Greg Smith, Op-Ed., Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2012, at A27.
23. See infra notes 44–57 and accompanying text.  Even one of the earliest and
most ardent proponents of capitalism noted the mischief that could arise from
such an arrangement:
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers
rather of other people’s money than their own, it cannot be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
264–65 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1977).
24. Delaware’s statute is typical here.  Section 141(a) of the Delaware Corpo-
rate Code provides: “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); accord MOD. BUS. CORP.
ACT§ 801(b).
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other stakeholders in the company (employees, consumers, communities,
and society at large).  The latter group of course has a legitimate interest
in the honest and effective operation of their corporations and can be
hurt by wrongdoing there.25
The law has attempted to constrain those corrupting tendencies by
imposing special fiduciary duties on these insiders and their allies.26  And
because of their unique role in American corporate jurisprudence,27 the
obligation to determine whether controlling managers and their allies
have acted fairly and in good faith has fallen on the courts of Delaware.28
25. See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.  One well-respected aca-
demic has recently argued, against the conventional outlook, that the interests of
these corporate constituents are equally as important as those of stockholders, i.e.
that a corporation should not be run primarily for the profit of shareholders and
that the law in fact does not require that. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHARE-
HOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012) (arguing particular method for running corporation).
26. See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
27. Even though large corporations operate in many states and a number of
countries, basic American corporate law is created not by the federal government
but by the states, specifically, the jurisdiction where a particular company has been
incorporated.  This is known as the Internal Affairs Doctrine.  Some have ascribed
this anomaly to federalism. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE
321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993); see also Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Ori-
gins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006) (arguing doctrine’s in-
ception was not owing to competition among states).  Instead, its origins depended
on “a fortuitous sequence of events, driven by ideology, interest group influences,
and institutional inertia.” Id. at 34.The Internal Affairs Doctrine therefore
prescribes that the essential rights and duties of corporate actors are set by the
states of their incorporation.  As the United States Supreme Court put it:
The beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact
that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—is organized under,
and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corpo-
rate law of the State of its incorporation.
. . . .
It is thus an accepted part of the business landscape in this country
for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define
the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89–91 (1987).  American states-
men from James Madison to 20th century presidents like Theodore Roosevelt, Wil-
liam Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt have disdained this
jurisprudence.  Alex Marshall, How to Get Business to Pay Its Share, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2012, at A23.  As early as 1787 Madison foresaw that someday companies would
grow so large that they “would pass beyond the authority of a single state, and
would do business in other states.” Id.  He therefore urged that the federal govern-
ment should “grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good may
require them, and the authority of a single state may be incompetent.” Id.  Since
the 1930s, however, the federal government has regulated public companies, al-
though in an indirect way, by the federal securities laws.  The focus of those stat-
utes is by and large disclosure, not rules of substantive conduct for the governance
of corporations. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); see gener-
ally CHOPER, COFFEE & GILSON, supra note 6, at 299–304.
28. Delaware’s predominant position in corporate law came about in the first
part of the 20th century. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).  As the corporation became the dominant
legal form for large firms, the story goes, states began competing with one another
6
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This Article will therefore begin in Part II by discussing the seminal
Delaware cases that established those duties.29  It will describe how they
evolved, in common law form,30 from the general rules governing the obli-
gations of corporate managers.  Parts III and IV will focus more particu-
larly on opinions from the 1980s and 1990s that made new application of
those principles.  Courts developed many of the principles in cases that
dealt with defensive tactics invented to discourage the hostile takeovers
that were surging during those decades.
Part V will assess how those fiduciary standards have formed the basis
for decisions in several recent and very significant opinions.  Those cases
have come from the increased acquisition activity as the economy re-
to gain the fees that would come with chartering them. Id.  Many have said this
created an unseemly “race to the bottom,” with states vying to be the most lax in
regulation.  Delaware allegedly won that inglorious contest.  Delaware was appar-
ently motivated to become the top state of incorporation because of the large pay-
ments that small state could garner from that process.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Cor-
porate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002).  In the first part of the last decade, it was
raking in over $600 million in franchise fees for a jurisdiction with a population of
only 796,000. Id. at 556 n.13.  This revenue constitutes a large percentage of the
state’s budget. Id. at 556.
Delaware was therefore “said to have a bad name, as a haven for incumbent
management.” Barbarians in the Valley, ECONOMIST, June 26, 2003, at 61.  Yet in
recent years things may have turned around, with a belief that the courts there
“have become more sensitive to the wishes of big shareholders.” Id.; see also Paul D.
Brown & K. Tyler O’Connell, Key 2011 Corporate Law Decisions Include Notable Stock-
holder Victories in the Delaware Courts, BUS. LAW TODAY (Jan. 23, 2012), http://apps.
americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2012/01/article-2-brown-oconnell.shtml.
For a discussion of cases evidencing that change, see infra notes 310-55 and accom-
panying text.
Others have argued that Delaware has justly earned its preeminence as the
nation’s business tribunal.  As one noted authority put it: “[c]orporations often
prefer to litigate issues in Delaware rather than elsewhere because of the knowl-
edge, expertise, sophistication and experience of the Chancellor and the four Vice
Chancellors on corporate matters.” HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 4, at
147.  For a discussion on the efficiency of Delaware in adjudicating corporate
claims, see Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor
Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497 (2000).  In any event, Delaware is currently
the state of incorporation for more than fifty percent of all U.S. publicly traded
companies and sixty-three percent of companies on the Fortune 500 list. HAMIL-
TON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 4, at 148.  With some understatement, therefore,
the then Vice-Chancellor and now Chancellor of Delaware commented that his
state has “some modest importance in the American scheme of corporate govern-
ance.”  Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002).
29. See infra notes 44–57 and accompanying text.
30. Apropos of the fact-rooted nature of that jurisprudence one observer said,
“Delaware judicial opinions are known for their story-like narrative approach . . . .”
Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
457, 527 (2009).  Another made much the same point calling them “a set of para-
bles” about good and bad directors.  Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
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bounds from the financial meltdown of the last decade.31  Delaware’s
Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors have been apt at finding instances of un-
fairness and self-dealing in those cases.32 Yet they have been less success-
ful, I will argue, in fashioning effective remedies for that wrongdoing.
Part VI of this Article will conclude with an assessment of Delaware’s
fiduciary jurisprudence in this area.  As the title of this Article states, it is
murky because the jurists of that small state struggle with competing con-
siderations.  Yet, because of quirks in our jurisprudence, their tribunals
have the ultimate supervisory power over corporate directors.
On the one hand, the courts must hold corporate directors to faithful
execution of their responsibilities, policing against corrupt insider profits
and inefficient entrenchment—making sure directors are ultimately ac-
countable to their shareholders and the financial markets.  To that end I
will urge that courts should make more use of that great tool of Equity, the
injunction, to stop mergers and acquisitions outright where corrupt activ-
ity is evident and to fashion ancillary relief to prohibit its recurrence.33
On the other hand, the Delaware courts have also been keenly aware
that the profitability and sustainability of each business is committed to
the care of its directors.  They therefore want to give directors sufficient
latitude to manage their firms according to their best judgments.  This has
resulted in an unwillingness to second-guess corporate strategy—particu-
larly when it can plausibly inure to the long-term benefit of the overall
enterprise.
Delaware courts will thus continue to walk that line, often perhaps by
condoning or reproving board decisions on grounds that may not be obvi-
ous from their opinions.  In doing that, I will argue, judges are expressing
the ambivalence that most Americans feel about our economic system—
respecting its potential for productivity, but distrustful of the damage it
can cause when short-term profit-maximization is its guiding principle.  It
is an open question whether the approach administered by the courts of
Delaware is best serving the interest of society.  I will therefore conclude
by proposing a more effective tribunal for those concerns.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
A. Early Notions of Corporate Fiduciary Duties
Prohibitions on conflicts of interest are as old as the Scriptures.34  In
English jurisprudence courts of equity developed the law of trusts to pre-
scribe the responsibilities of those who held legal title to property on be-
31. See infra notes 270–355 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 270–355 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 356–75 and accompanying text.
34. “No man can serve two masters.” Matthew 6:24.
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half of others.35  Equity called those special obligations fiduciary duties,36
and under its “No Further Inquiry”37 rule any arrangement that violated
those duties was voidable even if it was fair to the beneficiaries of the trust.
Corporate law adopted those obligations to regulate the activity of boards
of directors that managed companies for their shareholders who provided
the entrepreneurial capital.38
Yet the nature of fiduciary standards for corporate officers and direc-
tors developed over time.  Early decisions showed a judicial distrust of al-
most any dealings that management had with their companies and made
the dealings voidable by the shareholders.39  That absolutist approach,
however, eased over time as it became apparent that some of these related
party transactions were beneficial to corporations.40  The law thus shifted
to allow such transactions if they were ratified in good faith by disinter-
ested directors41 or shareholders,42 or if they could be shown to be fair to
the corporation.43
B. The Changing Realities of Corporate Control
As corporations evolved, the dynamics of their ownership also devel-
oped.  In the early years, large shareholders typically served as the direc-
35. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983). As Chancel-
lor Strine and his co-authors put it almost poetically: “[t]racing this doctrine back
into the womb of equity, whence it sprang, the foundation becomes plain.”  Leo J.
Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loy-
alty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
629, 643 (2010).  “Wherever one man or a group of men entrusted another man
or group with the management of property, the second group became fiduciaries.”
Id.
36. From the Latin word “fides” meaning faith.  Strine et al., supra note 35, at
645.  Delaware Justice Randy Holland made the same point commenting on the
Latin adjective “fidelis” meaning loyal or faithful.  Randy J. Holland, Delaware Direc-
tors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 700–01 (2009).
37. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b) (2000); see also Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Direc-
tors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).
38. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).  The
Lord Chancellor of England first ruled on that in 1742 holding that corporate
directors are both agents and trustees and must act with “fidelity and reasonable
diligence.” Id.  As the United States Supreme Court put it: “[d]irectors and man-
agers, if not technically trustees, occupy positions of a fiduciary nature.”  Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949).
39. See Marsh, supra note 37, at 35.  That may have reflected a skeptical view-
point best expressed by Justice Louis Brandeis.  That renowned jurist wrote most
compellingly about the inherent potential for misuse that comes when financial
stewards are entrusted with wealth owned by others. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).
40. HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 4, at 745.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2010); accord MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b)(1).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2010); accord MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b)(2).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2010); accord MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b)(3).
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tors of their corporations.44  As stock was sold broadly in public offerings,
however, share ownership became widely diffused.45  In a 1932 study,
Professors Berle and Means definitively documented the resulting separa-
tion of corporate ownership from control.46
The professors found that in the largest corporations it was rare that
one shareholder owned even one percent of the outstanding stock.47
Stockholders of big publicly held firms, those legally entitled to their
residual profits, had thus lost the power to run their companies.  That
power had gone to a managerial class that formally perpetuated its power
by soliciting shareholder proxies to elect its nominees for the board.48
Berle and Means went on to define the large issues arising from that
new reality:
The surrender of control over their wealth by investors has effec-
tively broken the old property relationships and has raised the
problem of defining these relationships anew.  The direction of
industry by persons other than those who have ventured their
wealth has raised the question of the motive force back of such
44. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corpo-
rate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986), available at http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/lg_shareholders.pdf.  As two noted scholars
have recently put it: “industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vander-
bilt, Andrew Mellon, and Andrew Carnegie ruled empires that rivaled whole coun-
tries in their size and scope—and power.  The companies had public shareholders,
but the men who built them held huge stakes to back their stewardship.” ROBERT
A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 120 (5th ed. 2011).
45. Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, Q.J.
ECON., Aug. 1930, at 561, 562.
46. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER COIT MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
47. Means, supra note 45, at 571.  Looking back, a leading contemporary cor-
porate scholar summed up those landmark insights:
A little over fifty years ago, Berle and Means reported that the separa-
tion of ownership and control in the modern corporation had left share-
holders effectively powerless, as managers could neither be ousted from
office by shareholders who were widely dispersed, and therefore incapa-
ble of coordinated action, nor disciplined effectively by the capital mar-
ket—at least so long as managers could rely on internal cash flow to
finance corporate expansion.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1986).  A reverse trend has arisen in recent years that would
once again concentrate corporation ownership in large holders of stock such as
mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors. See MONKS & MI-
NOW, supra note 44, at 154–237.
48. See Exchange Act Rules 14a-14b, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-14b (2012); see also
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 44, at 125 (attributing this “disenfranchisement” of
shareholders to “management’s vastly superior access to the proxy, both procedur-
ally (in terms of resources) and substantively (in terms of appropriate subject mat-
ter)”). But see Ben Protess & Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Changing Face of Investor
Activism, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at B1 (describing renewed recent efforts of
mainstream shareholders to assert power in governance of their corporations).
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direction and the effective distribution of the returns from busi-
ness enterprise.49
The year before, however, Berle set out his own theory of how corpo-
rate law should deal with the fear that corporate managers would channel
the wealth of their businesses into their own pockets.50  The title of Profes-
sor Berle’s piece said it all: Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust.51  He analo-
gized corporate directors to trustees who are given wide latitude in
managing the property of their beneficiaries so long as they do so as fidu-
ciaries.52  Every corporate act, therefore, had to not only be executed in
technical compliance with the law but also had to be judged “with a view
toward discovering whether under all the circumstances the result fairly
protects the interests of the shareholders.”53
Berle went on to illustrate those principles as they would be applied
to five “‘absolute’ corporate powers:”—issuing stock, declaring dividends,
acquiring stock in another corporation, amending the corporate charter,
and effecting mergers.54  He defined the latter as broadly encompassing
any transfer of the corporate enterprise.55
Berle then cited recent cases that had moved the law from a concern
that those maneuvers were only made in formal compliance with the law
to one where fairness to minority shareholders was the ultimate stan-
dard.56  He concluded that even though “business situation[s] demand
greater flexibility than the trust situation,” the rules of corporate govern-
ance should nevertheless become in substance a branch of that body of
law.57
C. Foundational Cases on the Duties of Corporate Management
Just a few years after Berle and Means’s groundbreaking work, the
Delaware Supreme Court followed Berle’s theory of trusteeship in its semi-
nal decision on corporate fiduciary duties, Guth v. Loft, Inc.58  Guth was
the president of a company named Loft that operated a chain of candy
49. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 46, at 2.
50. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. Id. at 1050 (introducing “‘absolute’ corporate powers” concept with em-
phasis on “absolute”); id. at 1050–74 (discussing individual absolute corporate
powers).
55. Id. at 1070.
56. Id. at 1070–73.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).  The Delaware Supreme Court
had already expressed its view that directors owe fiduciary duties to their share-
holders.  Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A.2d 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d, 140
A.2d 246 (Del. 1927).
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stores using Coca-Cola syrup.  When Coke raised its prices, Guth asked a
vice-president of Loft to investigate buying the company that produced
Pepsi-Cola, which was then in bankruptcy and for sale.59
Loft had ample funds to buy Pepsi, but without offering the opportu-
nity to Loft, Guth bought the company secretly himself through another
firm that he owned.60  He even had the soft drink produced at Loft’s facili-
ties.61  In doing that, the court said, Guth furthered his personal interests
in a way that was “incompatible with the superior interests of his corpora-
tion.”62  Therefore, the court found that his breach of loyalty to Loft
showed “gross violations of legal and moral duties” and ordered that he
account to Loft’s shareholders for his profits in Pepsi.63
In a later, significant case, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,64 where the con-
trolling shareholder was another corporation, the Delaware Supreme
Court elaborated on this duty of loyalty and distinguished it from situa-
tions where it would defer to a board’s business judgment.  The plaintiff
there was a minority shareholder in Sinven, a corporation that operated
solely in Venezuela.65  Ninety-seven percent of Sinven was owned by Sin-
clair, which named all of its directors.66
Because of this parent-subsidiary relationship, the court said, Sinclair
owed Sinven a fiduciary duty.67  It further noted that such a special obliga-
tion is particularly relevant when the parent is on both sides of a transac-
tion and can therefore receive something from the subsidiary to the
detriment of its minority shareholders.68  The court then discussed two
questioned transactions: one where the court found the parent had not
acted improperly; and the other where the parent had breached its fiduci-
ary duty to the subsidiary.69
In the first transaction, Sinclair caused Sinven to pay out large divi-
dends, distributing the lion’s share of them to the parent.70  Sinven’s mi-
nority shareholders however received their pro rata portion of those
payments.71  Even though the plaintiff claimed the large dividends left
Sinven without resources to expand, the court deferred to the directors’
59. Guth, 5 A.2d at 512.
60. Id. at 513.
61. Id. at 512.
62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 510.
64. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
65. Id. at 719.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 720.
69. Id. at 720–23.
70. Id. at 720.
71. See id. at 721-22.
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR106.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-FEB-13 12:09
2013] M&A FIDUCIARY DUTIES 133
business judgment as to how the company’s resources should be used.72
The court found that there had been no improper self-dealing.73
In the second transaction, however, Sinven’s minority shareholders
were able to convince the court that Sinclair had treated Sinven unfairly.74
There, Sinclair made Sinven agree to sell Sinclair’s crude and refined oil
subsidiary at specific prices.75  Sinclair, however, had the purchasing sub-
sidiary breach that contract by failing to pay for the oil on time and in the
minimum amounts stipulated.76  The relationship was thus unfair to
Sinven’s minority shareholders.77  Sinclair was able to enrich itself at the
shareholders’ expense, and in doing so it breached its duty of loyalty to
them.78
When Delaware’s jurisprudence involving duties of loyalty does not
control, however, directors have only to use due care and have a rational
basis for their actions.  Under the business judgment rule, courts will defer
to their choices.79  A leading case, Aronson v. Lewis,80 explains that distinc-
tion, but the opinion itself is puzzling because the transaction in question
had all the earmarks of self-dealing.  It involved a lucrative consulting
agreement and an interest-free loan that the board gave to a seventy-five
year old retired director who owned forty-seven percent of the company’s
72. Id. at 722.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 723.
75. See id. at 722–23.
76. See id. at 723.
77. See id.
78. Id.  In another significant parent-subsidiary case a decade later, Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court also
found that a parent company had breached its fiduciary duties to the minority
shareholders of its subsidiary. Id.  There, a parent company that had acquired a
majority interest in a subsidiary and controlled over half of its board planned to
give the subsidiary’s minority shareholders cash for their shares in a take-out
merger, a practice allowed under Delaware law when the boards of both compa-
nies approve. Id. at 703.
The parent charged two of its officers, who were also directors of the subsidi-
ary, to do a secret feasibility study about the price the parent could profitably pay
for the subsidiary’s shares. Id. at 705.  The figure they came up with was much
greater than what the parent ultimately paid the minority shareholders. Id.  The
figure was also supported by an investment banker’s hastily prepared fairness opin-
ion. Id.  The court again found this self-dealing to be a breach of the duty of
loyalty that the parent company owed to the minority shareholders of its subsidiary
because it failed to give them fair value for their shares. Id. at 715.
79. One commentator has cleverly called that principle “a rule that is not a
rule.”  Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 654 (2002).  As that distinguished corporate scholar put it,
“[m]ost generally, the business judgment rule acts as a presumption in favor of
corporate managers’ actions. Id. at 632.  “Stronger still, the rule provides a safe
harbor that makes both directors and their actions unassailable if certain prerequi-
sites have been met.” Id.
80. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (2000).
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stock.81  A shareholder brought a derivative suit82 charging that those pay-
ments had “no valid business purpose” because the aged director per-
formed “no or little services.”83  The situation presented an obvious
conflict because a director and dominant shareholder were entering into
financial dealings with his corporation where the company may not have
been getting fair value.84
Following accepted practice, however, the court held that whether a
wronged corporation should bring an action for its alleged injury was a
decision for the board.85  A shareholder, thus, has to make a demand on
the board under Chancery Rule 23.186 to initiate the suit unless the share-
holder can show such action will be futile.87  To do that, a stockholder will
have to demonstrate that there existed a reasonable doubt that “the direc-
tors are disinterested and independent and the challenged transaction was
otherwise the product of a valid business judgment.”88
Surprisingly, in this situation the court found no such grounds to ex-
cuse the demand even though a forty-seven percent shareholder is usually
able to control a board.  In addition, it was questionable whether the di-
rector receiving those high payments could render services to the corpora-
tion justifying them.  Nevertheless, the court found no conflict and
deferred to the board’s business judgment, dismissing the suit.89
But just when it seemed that Delaware would give directors a free pass
on any corporate decision that did not involve their personal interests, its
high court issued a startling opinion, Smith v. Van Gorkom.90  In Sinclair,
the court had seemingly reaffirmed its traditional deference to manage-
ment with comments like this, “[a] board of directors enjoys a presump-
tion of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if
81. Id. at 809.
82. Derivative suits are legal mechanisms whereby shareholders can bring an
action on behalf of their corporation against officers and directors who have
wronged it.  The Supreme Court has called them: “the chief regulator of corporate
management.”  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
The author has written several articles about those actions.  Morrissey, Shareholder
Litigation After the Meltdown, supra note 20, at 550–52; Morrissey, The Path of Corpo-
rate Law: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 20, at 993–95; Daniel J. Morrissey, New Rulings Threaten the Derivative Suit—
Will the “Needed Policeman” Keep Walking the Beat?, 36 S.C. L. REV. 631 (1985).
83. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805.
84. See id. at 808–09.
85. See id. at 811–13.
86. Accord Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (2013), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/
forms/download.aspx?id=39138.
87. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
88. Id.  In a later case, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that these
prongs are disjunctive.  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).  If either is
satisfied, demand is excused. Id.
89. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817–18.
90. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”91  However, Van
Gorkom found directors liable for gross negligence in the approval of a
merger.
Jerome Van Gorkom, the chairman and chief executive officer of a
public company, negotiated a sale of the firm on his own and then called a
special meeting of his board on one day’s notice—keeping it in the dark
about the agenda.92  Only when the directors gathered did he finally tell
them of his deal for the company, a cash-out merger that would give its
shareholders a premium over the market price of their stock.93  Even
then, Van Gorkom furnished his directors no documents about the
transaction.94
In support of his assertion that the merger price was a good deal for
the shareholders, Van Gorkom offered only an internal study finding that
a leveraged buyout of the company would be feasible at a comparable
cost.95  He provided the board no opinion about the merger’s fairness
from an outside expert.96  Yet he urged that the directors immediately
approve it, which they did.97
Even though there were provisions in the merger agreement that al-
lowed for the solicitation of competing offers, the court found they were
too restrictive to establish any true market test for Van Gorkom’s deal.98
Therefore, the court held that even though the directors had not person-
ally profited from the questioned transaction, the business judgment rule
would not protect their decision.99  Instead, the directors breached their
fiduciary duties to make an informed and deliberate decision about this
matter of ultimate importance for their company.100
Alarmed that this would open corporate management to widespread
second-guessing of their activities, the Delaware legislature quickly added
Section 102(b)(7) to its Corporate Code.101  It became known as the
91. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
92. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
93. Id. at 868.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 879–80.
99. See id. at 890–92.
100. See id. at 893.  For further commentary arguing that Van Gorkom is really
about a board’s duty to search for the true worth of a company and thus a prelude
to the Revlon rule, see infra notes 179–93 and accompanying text. See also Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden
Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521 (2002).
101. The provision was adopted by the Delaware legislature in 1986 in re-
sponse to a purported liability insurance crisis for corporate officers and directors
brought on by Van Gorkom.  Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d. 1075, 1095 (Del.
2001).
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“raincoat”102 because the provision offered protection from monetary lia-
bility to the management of any company that adopted it.  A firm need
only place an exculpatory statement to that effect in its certificate of
incorporation.
Certain improper activities, however, were exempt from that blanket
absolution.  Chief among them were breaches of duties of loyalty, actions
undertaken in bad faith, and those that involved intentional misconduct
or knowing violation of the law.103  Also excluded were any transactions
from which a director received an improper personal benefit.104  Dela-
ware cases then started talking about a “triad” of fiduciary duties owed by
directors to their corporations and shareholders: due care, good faith, and
loyalty.105  Commentators followed with elaborate dissections of the differ-
ences between those three obligations and how their standards for fulfill-
ment might vary.106
As a general principal, directors could not be liable for mere breaches
of the duty of care, even grossly negligently ones such as in Van Gorkom.107
Yet directors could still be held to answer for conduct so wrongful that it
was undertaken in “bad faith” and two cases decided in 2006 fleshed out
what that term meant.  One, Stone v. Ritter,108 involved a derivative suit
charging that directors had failed to exercise oversight of employees who
did not file proper reports under bank secrecy and anti-money laundering
laws.109  The court held that for bad faith liability to be predicated on such
inactivity it had to be almost deliberate—“that the directors knew that they
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”110  The court then ruled
that the board would not be liable in Stone because it had acted to assure
the existence of “a reasonable information and reporting system” and no
“red flags” indicating impropriety appeared to call the directors’ good
faith into question.111
102. See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home to the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat,
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131 (2005).
103. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).  The Model Act has followed
suit. See MOD BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a).
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d. 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
106. Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries
of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006);
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).
107. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d. 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001).
108. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
109. Charges that directors have breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
monitor employees are called Caremark claims.  The term comes from a Chancery
Court decision upholding the settlement of a derivative suit alleging such viola-
tions. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
110. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006).
111. Id. at 373.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR106.txt unknown Seq: 17 19-FEB-13 12:09
2013] M&A FIDUCIARY DUTIES 137
The second case, Brehm v. Eisner (“Disney”),112 involved a cause
ce´le`bre in the entertainment business.  The Disney Company hired famed
talent agent Michael Ovitz as its president but fired him only a year
later.113  That cost Disney approximately $130 million in severance pay-
ments.114  Shareholder plaintiffs charged that the actions of Disney’s
board were so improvident that they constituted bad faith.115  In response,
the court first defined “bad faith,” holding that it does not necessarily re-
quire a showing of spiteful or malevolent intent.116  It can also be satisfied
by “an intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s re-
sponsibilities.”117  Yet, even though the court found that the directors did
not follow best practices in employing and terminating Ovitz,118 their con-
duct did not reach the level of wrongdoing that would constitute “bad
faith.”119  Thus, the directors had not breached their fiduciary duties and
their decision was entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule.120
It seemed after Disney that Delaware courts would be willing to toler-
ate high levels of wrongful conduct when directors were charged with
careless actions.  A ruling from Chancellor Chandler, however, reaffirmed
that the standard for misconduct there is not inordinately high.  In a 2009
decision,121 he refused to dismiss a waste claim involving compensation
paid to Citigroup’s CEO Charles Prince.  Mr. Prince was given sixty-eight
million dollars in severance upon leaving the company after the collapse
of the housing market.122
After stating the general authority of boards to set executive compen-
sation, the Chancellor made this telling comment:
It is also well settled in our law, however, that the discretion of
directors in setting executive compensation is not unlimited.  In-
deed, the Delaware Supreme Court was clear when it stated that
“there is an outer limit” to the board’s discretion to set executive
compensation, “at which point a decision of the directors on ex-
112. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
113. Id. at 44.
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id. at 52.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Id. at 65–66.
118. The first part of the title of a fine article sums up Disney’s ill-considered
action.  Marc. I Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disney Goes Goofy: Agency, Delega-
tion, and Corporate Governance, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 201 (2008).
119. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 63.
120. Two circuit court opinions, however, appear to take a broader view of
director liability than Disney for corporate wrongdoing that is not protected by
Section 102(b)(7). See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holder Litig., 325 F.3d 795
(7th Cir. 2003); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
121. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009).
122. Id. at 138.
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ecutive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be un-
conscionable and constitute waste.”123
The Chancellor went on to examine the allegations that Mr. Prince’s large
payments were improper, particularly since he was allegedly responsible
for huge losses suffered by the company in the financial meltdown.124
The Chancellor found that they raised a reasonable doubt that Citi’s
board was well informed, careful, and rational in approving that compen-
sation plan.125
The next year, Delaware’s current Chancellor, Leo J. Strine, co-au-
thored an article on that point with several other scholars of that state’s
corporate jurisprudence.126  They argued that good faith is closely akin, if
not rooted, in the ideal of loyalty.  That, they said, “requires that the ac-
tion have been undertaken in good faith to advance the interests of the
shareholders” as defined by the law creating that entity.127  Conscious dis-
regard of one’s duties is thus really disloyal conduct, a point that has been
made earlier by other scholars.128
One commentator rephrased this as “[u]nder the current law, the
duty of loyalty prohibits not only self-interested transactions but also know-
ing breaches of the duty of care, and, more importantly, actions that are
illegal even where they are intended to benefit the corporation and maxi-
mize profits.”129  That broad concept of loyalty might even buttress the
ethic of corporate social responsibility, as that commentator argued.  It
would see “the moral corporation as a necessary ingredient of civil society”
123. Id.
124. Id. at 129–30.
125. Id. at 136.
126. Strine et al., supra note 35.
127. Id. at 643.
128. As two law and economics scholars put it:
It is conventional to draw a sharp distinction between the duty of
care . . . and the duty of loyalty . . . .  The usual explanation for this
dichotomous treatment is that the decisions tainted by a conflict of inter-
est are entitled to less judicial deference than those that are not.  Some
have argued that the differences between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty are so fundamental that the latter should be strengthened and the
former abolished.
Ultimately, though, there is no sharp line between the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty.  What is the difference between working less hard
than promised at a given level of compensation (a breach of the duty of
care) and being compensated more than promised at a given level of
work (a breach of the duty of loyalty)?  Both are agency costs, conflicts of
interest in an economic sense, that reduce shareholders’ wealth.  The ex-
istence of a conflict of interest, therefore, cannot explain the distinction
between the duties of care and loyalty.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 103 (1991) (footnote omitted).
129. David Rosenberg, Delaware’s “Expanding Duty of Loyalty” and Illegal Con-
duct: A Step Towards Corporate Social Responsibility, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 81, 83
(2012).
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and include the interests of all its stakeholders in that fiduciary obliga-
tion.130  Indeed, Chancellor Strine and his co-authors implied as much.
Even when directors act with an intent to maximize profits, their actions
would not be in the best interests of shareholders if they are inimical to
society as a whole.131
Chancellor Strine and his co-authors also had no problem turning
aside charges that their all-encompassing duty of loyalty made other ex-
plicitly stated obligations of directors redundant.  They called such re-em-
phasis a “pervasive presence in statutes and contracts” and a “belt and
suspenders protection against unintended consequences.”132  Thus, the
“new categories” of non-exculpatory conduct provided in Section
102(b)(7) hardly created any additional fiduciary duties.
For instance, one could take an extremely narrow reading of the duty
of loyalty as only the negative obligation not to profit at the expense of the
corporation.  Yet, even then, the new prohibition to not receive “improper
personal benefit” could only be distinguished from that at great diffi-
culty.133  It could very well be just a re-enforcement of the obvious princi-
ple that directors should not loot their corporations.134
III. APPLYING MANAGEMENT’S DUTIES TO M&A
A. The Time of Hostile Take-Overs
The era of tender offers played out against this background of devel-
oping fiduciary principles.  It began in the mid-1960s with aggressors try-
ing to gain controlling interests in companies by making public proposals
to purchase their shares.  Those offers stated the buyers’ willingness to pay
shareholders of target companies a premium in cash over the market price
of their stock.135  Up until then, those maneuvers had an unsavory reputa-
tion among the corporate establishment.  They were something that was
only done by “raiders” intent on looting viable companies.136
When Congress began considering a legislative response to the new
phenomenon, its primary intent was to protect established companies
from such “corporate piracy.”137  But a new justification for tender offers
was emerging from law and economics jurisprudence.  Hostile takeovers
130. Id. at 103.
131. Strine et al., supra note 35, at 653.
132. Id. at 660.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 4, at 1003.
136. James C. Wine, Private Litigation Under the Williams Act: Standing to Sue,
Elements of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545, 553 (1982).  Just what constituted
“looting,” however, could be a tricky question. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955) (involving premium for control given for ability to sell steel
produced by company).
137. In 1965 Senator Harrison Williams spoke of “proud old companies” that
were beset by “white-collar pirates.”  111 CONG. REC. 28,257 (1965).
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were really a form of shareholder empowerment—a response to Berle and
Means’s classic criticism of unaccountable corporate management.138
Stock prices, as that theory went, decline when management is ineffi-
cient in deploying its firm’s resources to their most profitable uses.  Such
underpriced companies attract bidders who want to gain controlling inter-
ests in the corporation’s shares.  The bidders can then dismiss the un-
derperforming incumbent officials and restructure the company to
achieve its most gainful ends.139
In such scenarios, everyone supposedly benefited except the manag-
ers who were replaced.  Selling shareholders received a premium for their
stock, remaining investors had their wealth enhanced, and the bidder
profited by the difference it paid for the controlling shares and the new
higher value of the restructured company.  Most importantly, the eco-
nomic well-being of society as a whole advanced because of a more pro-
ductive use of its scarce resources.140  Even the threat of a hostile take-
over, it was said, disciplined management to be more attentive to maximiz-
ing their firm’s earnings for fear of being replaced if its stock was
undervalued.141
Therefore, federal legislation, when it took final form in the Williams
Act of 1968, adopted a neutral position vis-a`-vis the regulation of tender
offers.  It didn’t aim to stop them, but just to ensure that tendering share-
holders received fair treatment.142  The legal action then shifted to the
138. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168–69 (1981);
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
139. Stewart Toy, Elizabeth Ehrlich, Aaron Bernstein & Stan Crock, The Raid-
ers, “They Are Really Breaking the Vise of the Managing Class,” BUS. WK., Mar. 4, 1985, at
80, 83.
140. In an editorial from that era, the Wall Street Journal wrote:
Capitalist structures need to evolve, and we certainly are not willing
to leave the evolution solely to incumbent managements that represent
the old order.  We find ourselves sympathizing  when in defense of his
controversial activities, a Carl Icahn [a hostile bidder] argues that we
would not have the Rust Belt today if it had been possible to “pierce the
establishment” in the steel industry 20 years ago.
Creative Destruction—III: The Delaware Tilt, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1985, at 30.
141. Judge Henry Friendly famously called takeovers “the sharpest blade for
the improvement of corporate management . . . .” See Henry J. Friendly, Senior
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Speech at the ALI-ABA Re-
gional Symposium on the Structure and Governance of Corporations (May 4-6,
1978), reprinted in 3 ALI-ABA Course Materials J., no. 3, 1979 at 93, 128.
142. The Williams Act thus requires that bidders make appropriate disclo-
sures on such subjects as their goals and the sources of their funds.  It also slows
down the process so that the offeree shareholders can use that information to
make knowledgeable decisions about whether to tender their shares.  The Act con-
tains other provisions as well to protect the tendering shareholders by giving them
the ability to withdraw their shares during the offer, to have them purchased on a
pro rata basis with all other tendering shareholders, and to receive the highest
price in the offering.  To that end the Act adds sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e),
20
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legitimacy of responses that incumbent management could undertake ei-
ther in anticipation of tender offers or in answer to them.
Other viewpoints, however, not at all as sanguine as those of the law
and economics school, challenged those assumptions.  As Chancellor Al-
len described that contrary outlook:
In the financial setting of the 1980s, dramatically higher stock
prices could often be achieved by sharply increasing the debt of
the corporation and reducing or eliminating certain operations.
But increasing debt substantially made the enterprise riskier and
thus reduced the value of the corporation’s existing bonds and
restricting operations injured workers and management, who
were thrown out of work.143
According to Chancellor Allen, the surge of hostile tender offers in the
1980s therefore forced courts to confront an issue they had “papered
over” during the previous decades.144  Was the corporation to be primarily
run to maximize profits for shareholders?  Yes said the “Property” view,
best exemplified by holdings from some early 20th century cases.145  No,
responded the “Equity” theory, which maintained that the corporation
should be seen as an institution with a range of loyalties to many members
of society.146
The author wrote a trilogy of law review articles during that time
which covered the controversy and the significant legal decisions it pro-
duced.147  Because of their continuing relevance to the topic of this arti-
cle, this segment will summarize the salient issues of that era and the
holdings of the major cases that followed in their wake.
B. Questions About Defensive Tactics
Observers quickly noted that board actions to forestall hostile take-
overs were quite different from decisions directors made in routine com-
mercial matters.  The latter would be protected from judicial review by
unproblematic applications of the business judgment rule.  Unfriendly
and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and empowers the SEC to make
regulations to implement them. See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at 736–50.  For
an early article by two SEC lawyers highly critical of defensive tactics to impede
shareholders’ rights to tender, see Gary G. Lynch & Marc I. Steinberg, The Legiti-
macy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
143. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 274 (1992).
144. Id. at 272.
145. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
146. For an expostulation of that view, as it emerged in the 1930s, see E. Mer-
rick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
147. Daniel J. Morrissey, Law, Ethics, and the Leveraged Buyout, 65 U. DET. L.
REV. 403 (1988); Daniel J. Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers—Does Anything
Go?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 103, 124 (1986); Morrissey, supra note 12, at 47.
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tender offers, on the other hand, challenged not just the quality of the
directors’ management decisions but their very right to be in those
positions.
Because of that inherent tension, unsolicited tender offers posed a
direct conflict of interest for a board.148  Some commentators, therefore,
urged that legal tactics, which contested them, raised issues of loyalty, not
care.149  This structural bias might even infect outside directors who
would not only empathize with their colleagues employed by the target
company but would also lose their own privileged offices if a hostile take-
over was successful.150
C. Early Legal Responses Condoning Defensive Tactics
Nevertheless, cases from Delaware and the federal appellate courts
during this first wave of hostile takeovers generally accepted various tactics
undertaken by management to ward them off.  Delaware courts turned
aside claims that the takeovers constituted breaches of the directors’ duty
of loyalty.  Many of those involved the sale of stock by the board to either
placate a hostile bidder or to fend one off.
An early example of the former is Cheff v. Mathes,151 where the direc-
tors bought back shares from a potential hostile bidder at a premium over
the market price, a tactic that would later be called “greenmail.”152  Even
though just the year before the Delaware court had placed the burden on
directors to justify any strategy that might be undertaken to maintain their
control,153 it now held that such an action is not the same type of “self-
dealing” as when a director sells property to the corporation.154  It then
upheld the repurchase as necessary to quell unrest among key employees
and safeguard the firm from liquidation.155
Several subsequent cases from the federal circuits illustrated the latter
defensive tactic: selling shares to friendly groups to forestall a hostile bid-
der.  In two cases from the Second Circuit decided in 1980, Treadway Cos.
v. Care Corp.,156 and Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc.,157 the target com-
148. See Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role
of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1987) (proposing that only independent
directors be empowered to enter into mergers and only then with prior share-
holder approval).
149. This perspective gave rise to a spate of articles urging that boards remain
passive in the face of a hostile tender offer. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 138 and accompanying text; Gilson, supra note 138 and accompanying text.
150. For a more lengthy commentary written by the author during that time
period, see Morrissey, supra note 147, at 124.
151. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
152. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at 708.
153. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
154. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556–57.
155. Id.
156. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. 634 F. 2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
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panies sold shares to such a “White Knight” to discourage hostile bidders.
In both situations the courts disregarded the patent self-interest of boards
and approved the tactic under the business judgment rule because a plau-
sible argument was made that the take-over would be harmful to the cor-
poration and its shareholders.158
D. Unocal and the Poison Pill
Then in 1985, at the height of that decade’s tender offer fervor,159
the Delaware Supreme Court decided two landmark cases that endorsed a
target board’s power to resist them.  Both bowed to the directors’ tradi-
tional authority to manage a corporation as sanctioned by the business
judgment rule.
The first, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,160 involved a discrimina-
tory stock repurchase.  T. Boone Pickens, a notorious hostile bidder of
158. At about the same time, cases from both the Third and Seventh Circuits
also ruled in favor of incumbent managers against charges that certain of their
actions were designed only to retain control of the firm.  In the former, Johnson v.
Trueblood, the majority shareholder refused to raise funds that the company
needed by selling shares to minority shareholders because the majority would then
have lost control to the minority.  629 F.2d 287 (3d. Cir. 1980).  The court applied
the business judgment rule to dismiss the suit saying that it was appropriate to
defer to management absent a showing that impermissible motives predominated.
In the latter case, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., the target company adopted a
number of “shark-repellant” tactics to create anti-trust problems for a hostile bid-
der.  646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).  When the bidder withdrew its offer and the
company’s stock dropped considerably, shareholders sued.  The court however dis-
missed claims that the defensive tactics were unwarranted as “precisely this sort of
Monday–morning-quarterbacking that the business judgment rule was intended to
prevent.” Id. at 297.  It found justification for the board’s actions in “[t]he desire
to build value within the company, and the belief that such value might be dimin-
ished by a given offer.” Id. at 296.  In a later case from the Second Circuit, how-
ever, Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., the court refused to allow a defensive tactic
where a target’s board issued additional shares to two entities that it controlled.
744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).  The board would then have voting power of almost a
majority of the company’s shares. Id. at 267.  Not only was that action taken with-
out the required approval by the NYSE and the firm’s other shareholders, but the
company’s chairman admitted in a letter that he had taken it to fend off a hostile
takeover. Id. at 268–69.  With those facts, the court refused to condone the ma-
neuver finding that the board’s self-interest overruled the normal presumptions of
the business judgment rule. Id. at 269.
159. Financier Ivan Boesky made the signature statement from that epoch at
a business school commencement speech shortly before he was indicted for insider
trading: “Greed is all right by the way, . . . I think greed is healthy.  You can be
greedy and still feel good about yourself.” PATRICK DILLON & CARL M. CANNON,
CIRCLE OF GREED 108 (2010).  It was the template for Gordon Gecko’s famous dec-
laration that “greed if good” in Oliver Stone’s 1987 movie. Wall Street (20th Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp.).  Michael Douglas won an academy award for his role as
Gecko.  As one author wrote of that era of massive corporate change: “[d]uring
the 1980s, nearly half of all U.S. companies were restructured, more than 80,000
were acquired or merged, and over 700,000 sought bankruptcy protection in order
to reorganize and continue operations.” SHERMAN, supra note 1, at xii.
160. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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that day, made a “two-tier,” “front-end-loaded” tender offer for Unocal
proposing to buy part of that company’s stock for $54 per share in cash
and then exchange subordinated debt valued at that amount for the re-
mainder.161  To counter, Unocal offered to exchange high quality debt
securities valued at $72 for each of its common shares.  Pickens, however,
who then owned thirteen percent of the company’s stock was specifically
excluded from the deal.  The court found that tactic was reasonable given
the board’s view that Pickens’s offer was coercive and inadequate.162  It
described the directors’ role in a tender offer as that of a gatekeeper—
almost like their statutory duty to approve a merger or a sale of a firm’s
assets before they are submitted to shareholders for ratification.163
The Unocal court, however, circumscribed its holding by noting that it
found reasonable justification for the company’s defensive maneuver.164
It said, “[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any
perceived threat by any Draconian means available.”165  It spoke of an “en-
hanced duty”166 in such a situation where directors must show that they
have “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed because of another person’s stock ownership.”167
The second major Delaware opinion of 1985 followed Unocal rapidly
in time and faithfully in logic.  It was Moran v. Household Int’l Inc.,168 the
poison pill case. Moran officially condoned that most effective defense
against hostile takeovers—shifting the balance of power to management in
the 1980s wave of M&A deals.
The pill approved in Moran involved rights issued to the company’s
common shareholders to purchase $100 worth of its preferred shares.169
They were not valuable when issued but when someone made a tender
offer for a substantial amount of the company’s stock, a “flip-over” provi-
sion came into play.170  In the event of a merger, it gave the preferred
stockholders the ability to purchase $200 of the acquiring company’s stock
for $100, making Household prohibitively expensive for any hostile
buyer.171  That burdensome obligation, however, would not encumber a
friendly bidder because Household’s board retained the ability to redeem
the rights for a small amount any time before they became exercisable.172
161. Id. at 949.
162. Exchange Act Rule 13e-4(f)(8)(i) promulgated under authority given by
the SEC in the Williams Act now requires that tender offers be open to all security
holders of the class subject to the tender offer.
163. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 955.
166. Id. at 954.
167. Id. at 955.
168. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
169. Id. at 1349.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1354.
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Given its ruling in Unocal it was no surprise that the Delaware Su-
preme Court tolerated Household’s use of the pill.173  It appeared even
more appealing to the court because it was “pre-planned,” not enacted in
response to a particular hostile attack.174  The court also noted that the
board had the authority under the Delaware statutes to issue the preferred
shares with the flip-over rights.175  Acceding to the directors’ business
judgment, the court held that Household’s directors adopted the pill in
good faith to protect against a coercive tender offer.176
Even while approving the pill, however, the court added a caveat.
Under the appropriate circumstances, a bidder might make a tender offer
conditioned on the board’s redemption of the rights.177  The court indi-
cated that in such a case it would not permit an arbitrary refusal of that
demand.178
E. The Revlon Qualification and Its Aftermath
In the later 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court handed down two
other major cases on board fiduciary duties that dealt with the limits on
their discretion to oppose mergers and acquisitions.  One came in 1986, a
year after Unocal and Moran, and the other in 1989, as the takeover surge
of that era drew to a close.  The first, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.,179 began with a $45 per share tender offer for Revlon’s
shares by Pantry Pride.180  Revlon’s board responded by adopting a poison
pill.181  Pantry Pride raised its offer and, after some other defensive moves
by Revlon, Pantry Pride countered with an even higher bid.182
Revlon’s board then entered into a friendly merger with the Forst-
mann Group that would buy all the company’s stock for $56 per share and
agreed to some other actions that would benefit the company’s notehold-
ers.183  When the Forstmann merger was announced, Pantry Pride raised
its offer to $56.25.184  Forstmann, however, outbid Pantry Pride’s offer
when given financial data that Pantry Pride did not receive.185  Revlon also
sweetened its deal with Forstmann.186  It gave Forstmann an option to
purchase one of its divisions at a substantial discount if another bidder got
173. See id. at 1351 (discussing recent decision in Unocal).
174. Id. at 1350.
175. Id. at 1353.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1354–55.
178. Id. at 1354.
179. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
180. Id. at 176.
181. Id. at 180–81.
182. Id. at 178–79.
183. Id. at 184.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 178.
186. Id.
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40% of the company’s shares.187  It also put a no shop provision in its agree-
ment with Forstmann by which Revlon agreed not to seek other offers.188
When Pantry Pride sued, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
original poison pill as a legitimate response by Revlon.189  The court, how-
ever, ruled that things changed when the friendly suitor entered the pic-
ture.190  Because it then became apparent that the company would not
survive in its current form, “[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders
of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price
for the stockholders. . . .”191
Nor could the “auction ending” deal with Forstmann be defended as
a way to safeguard the interests of the noteholders.192  Like all creditors,
their rights were protected by contract law.  By the lockup arrangement
with Forstmann, Revlon’s directors breached their duty of loyalty to obtain
the highest price for their shareholders.193
In the second case, however, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.,194 the Delaware Supreme Court qualified its Revlon rule.  Time was
set to consummate a merger by a share exchange with Warner when Para-
mount announced a $175 cash tender offer for all of Time’s stock.195
Time’s board responded that Paramount’s price was inadequate even
though it was substantially above what its shares were trading for in the
open market.196
187. Id.
188. Id. at 178.
189. Id. at 175–76.
190. See id. at 176 (discussing friendly acquisitions).
191. Id. at 182.
192. Id.
193. Id.  But immediately after Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court, per Jus-
tice Moore, affirmed a defensive strategy under Unocal principles.  Ivanhoe Part-
ners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).  That case involved
another takeover bid by T. Boone Pickens. Id. at 1336.  He secretly purchased a
stake in Newmont and then announced a cash tender offer for enough shares to
gain control. Id.  Newmont responded by selectively paying a dividend to a twenty-
six percent shareholder who would respect the company’s independence. Id. at
1333–34.  The stockholder then increased its ownership in Newmont to 49.9%. Id.
Thwarted in his bid, Pickens sued to enjoin the dividend, but the court deferred to
Newmont’s business judgment and dismissed the suit. Id. at 1345–46.  Justice
Moore pointed to Pickens’s secret and coercive tactics and said they fit his “typical
modus operandi.” Id. at 1342.  Yet, two years later the Delaware Supreme Court fol-
lowed Revlon to find that a target board had mismanaged a bidding process that
was “tilted” in favor of one of the potential purchasers.  Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).  The board there was deceived by
management about the auction but was also culpably negligent itself by failing in
its duty of oversight, particularly since insiders were involved in the process. Id. at
1261.
194. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
195. Id. at 1147.
196. Id. at 1148.
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Time also claimed that Warner was a more appealing business partner
because it would respect its journalistic integrity.197  Time then restruc-
tured its arrangement with Warner in a way that would not require share-
holder approval.198  In turn, Paramount raised its offer to $200 per share
and sought to enjoin the Time-Warner deal.199
Chancellor Allen, however, refused to halt the merger rejecting Para-
mount’s argument that Revlon required Time to accept its higher bid.200
The Time-Warner merger, said the Chancellor, was not an outright sale of
control because ownership of the new firm remained in publicly traded
shares.201  In addition, the Time-Warner combination was a legitimate cor-
porate strategy and the business judgment rule allowed management some
discretion in long term planning even at the expense of short-term gain
for shareholders.202  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
the Chancellor’s ruling.203
197. Id. at 1143.
198. Id. at 1146.
199. Id. at 1149.
200. See In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 10670, slip op. at 56 (Del. Ch., July
14, 1989).
201. Id.
202. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1151.
203. See David B. Hilder and Laura Landro, Paramount Withdraws Its Hostile
Offer as Time Begins Its Purchase of Warner—Battle Ends as High Court in Delaware
Turns Down Paramount and Holders, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1989, at A3.  During oral
argument, after listening to Time’s counsel discuss other cases where the court
had deferred to directors’ long-term strategies, Justice Moore signaled his ap-
proval.  From the bench the author of both Unocal and Revlon said with exaspera-
tion: “[h]ow many times does the court have to speak on this?” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s lengthy opinion affirmed its tradition of def-
erence to a board’s business judgment. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1140.  It there
stated, “absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of
directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per
se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term.” Id. at 1150.  The court
also ruled that, by entering into the merger deal with Warner, Time had not “put
itself up for sale.” Id.  There was thus no Revlon event. Id.  A noted commentator
expressed dismay at the opinion stating: “[i]n Delaware today, shareholder protec-
tion is all too often largely rhetorical, lacking in substantive content.”  Marc I.
Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture Horror Show, 16 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 2 (1991).
A few years after its disappointing bid for Time, Paramount found itself on the
other side of a takeover.  It entered into a friendly merger arrangement with
Viacom that would give Viacom’s CEO a controlling interest in the new company.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  The agree-
ment also contained several provisions designed to make a competing bid more
difficult. Id. at 39.  Despite those barriers, QVC came in with a higher offer after
the Viacom-Paramount merger was announced. Id. at 41.  The Paramount board
rebuffed it and a bidding war ensued. Id.  When QVC requested “auction proce-
dures,” however, Paramount’s board continued to resist, holding fast to its pre-
ferred deal with Viacom. Id. at 41.
QVC then sued asking the Delaware Court to apply the Revlon and Unocal
principles to Paramount’s anti-takeover actions. Id. at 42.  That posed two signifi-
cant questions: was the proposed merger of Viacom-Paramount a Revlon event de-
manding a process to secure the best price for the company’s shareholders?; if so,
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IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE NEW WAVE OF MERGERS
A. The Rise of New Takeover Techniques
The merger surge of the 1980s died out for a short spell in the early
1990s204 but quickly resumed and strengthened as the high-tech boom of
that decade accelerated.205  By then, sophisticated anti-takeover tech-
niques, most prominently the poison pill,206 had taken hold and
presented a formidable barrier to simple cash tender offers.207  As a result,
a new generation of takeover strategies appeared to deal with that impreg-
nable defense which seemed to allow target boards to “Just Say No.”
A prominent strategy was on display in the case of Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer-
ican General Corp.,208 where a bidder sought to have its own directors
elected so they could neutralize a poison pill.  The target, Unitrin, first
adopted the pill in response to what it deemed was an inadequate tender
offer.209  And then to head off a proxy fight it announced a plan to repur-
chase its shares for a premium over their market price.210
Unitrin’s directors already owned twenty-three percent of its outstand-
ing shares and the repurchases would increase their holdings.211  That,
then were the defensive measures of the merger agreement justified under Unocal?
Id. at 49.
The Delaware Supreme Court answered “yes” to the first question and corre-
spondingly “no” to the second. Id. at 51.  The controlling interest in Paramount
was such a valuable asset, said the court, that its potential sale to Viacom’s CEO
brought Revlon into play. Id. at 48.  When that happened, the enhanced standard
of Unocal kicked in, negating the business judgment presumption that would favor
Paramount’s defensive actions. Id. at 45. Unlike Revlon, no break up of Paramount
was likely to result from its merger to Viacom, the court distinguished the QVC
matter from the earlier Time situation. Id. at 46.  After the merger there, control of
the new company would remain fluid in publicly held shares. Id. at 40.  After the
Paramount-Viacom merger, however, the CEO of Viacom would become the domi-
nant shareholder of a new consolidated company. Id. at 38.  The court found Par-
amount was effectively put up for sale when it made the preliminary merger
agreement with Viacom. Id. at 50.  That, the court said, triggered the board’s Rev-
lon duties to realize optimum value for their shareholders. Id. at 47.
204. Several events gave rise to that pause. See generally CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (affirming stronger anti-takeover defenses and
state anti-takeover statutes).  The Gulf War and a recession played their part as
well. See History of Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 14.  But perhaps the chief
reason was the criminal conviction of junk bond financier Michael Milliken. See
Predator’s Fall: Drexel Burnham Lambert, TIME (Feb. 26, 1990), http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969468,00.html.  Milliken’s firm Drexel Burn-
ham, had raise huge amounts of capital to make large hostile take-overs possible
and his imprisonment put an end to that stream of financing. Id.
205. See HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 4, at 997; see also BRATTON,
supra note 1, at 972.
206. GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at 706.
207. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contexts, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1134 (1990).
208. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
209. Id. at 1369.
210. Id. at 1370.
211. Id.
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along with a supermajority provision in the company’s certificate of incor-
poration, would enhance the ability of Unitrin’s management to frustrate
the bidder from electing its own directors in a proxy contest.212
When shareholders sued to challenge the stock repurchase, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery (“Chancery Court”) first found that no Revlon
event had occurred.213  The poison pill was therefore a proper reaction to
a perceived inadequate hostile bid.214  The lower court, however, enjoined
the stock repurchase plan because it might deter the bidder from waging a
proxy fight to elect its own directors to defuse the pill.215  But the Dela-
ware Supreme Court was not so sure of that.  The share repurchases were
not inherently coercive, it said.216  In conjunction with the other defenses,
they therefore might not be so draconian that they would preclude the
bidder’s efforts.217  The Delaware Supreme Court thus remanded the mat-
ter to the Chancery Court to determine whether the defensive measures
were reasonable under the Unocal standard.218
B. “Dead Hands” and “No Hands”
One traditionally acceptable but weak measure to forestall hostile
takeovers is to classify or stagger the terms of the target’s directors.219  Be-
cause only one-third of a board will then be up for election each year, it
will take a bidder with a majority of the shares two years to gain control of
the company.  That tactic can thus delay but not ultimately prevent the
acquirer’s success.220
After Unitrin, directors of potential target companies devised a
stronger way to entrench directors.  These were the so-called “dead hand”
and “no hand” provisions that would prohibit or greatly delay newly in-
stalled boards from neutralizing poison pills.  With such measures in
place, proxy contests to replace boards, even if successful, would be futile
because pills would still be there to make any unfriendly acquisition pro-
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1372.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1388.
217. Id.
218. Earlier, the Delaware Chancery Court allowed a target to sell shares to a
management friendly ESOP when it would thwart a sale to a bidder for an unfairly
low price.  Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989).
219. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010); accord MOD BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.06.
220. The incumbent directors may also feel psychological pressure to resign
rather than oppose the new majority shareholder, thus limiting that defense.
GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at 705.  Of late, the number of shareholder proposals to
eliminate these classified boards and have all directors stand for election annually
has shot up significantly.  Protess & Lewis, supra note 48.
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hibitively expensive.  Two Delaware cases in 1998, however, struck down
both versions of that strategy.
In Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.,221 shareholders challenged a “Contin-
uing Director” provision in a pill-like rights plan that stipulated it could be
removed only by the incumbent board.  A bidder who won a proxy contest
would thus find its own directors powerless to redeem the rights.222  The
Chancery Court therefore held that “dead hand” provision invalid as a
preclusive measure that disenfranchised the firm’s shareholders.223
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro,224 featured a similar defensive
strategy that was not quite so radical.225  There the target’s board adopted
two features to deter a hostile takeover.226  It amended the firm’s by-laws
to provide that any special shareholder meeting could only take place
ninety days after it had been requested.227  Any unwelcome bidder who
won a proxy contest would therefore have to wait three months before it
could elect new directors.228
The board also originally had a “dead-hand” pill removal feature like
Carmody’s.229  It replaced it, however, with a possibly more acceptable
delayed redemption provision.230  That required newly elected directors
to wait at least six months before they could bring about any transaction
like a merger with an entity that had elected them.231
The Chancery Court upheld the ninety-day waiting period.  The Dela-
ware Supreme Court however focused on the “no-hand” delayed redemp-
tion feature and found it invalid.232  Section 141(a) of the Delaware
Corporate Code provides that a board has the ultimate responsibility to
manage a corporation unless there are limits to its authority set out in the
firm’s certificate of incorporation.233
No such restrictions existed here and the “no-hand” feature made it
impossible for the newly elected directors to remove the pill for six
months.234  They therefore could not exercise their judgment to defuse
221. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
222. Id. at 1194.
223. Id. at 1180.  Earlier Delaware cases had taken a hard line against strate-
gies that disenfranchised shareholders. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del.
1992) (taking hard line stance against disenfranchising strategies); Blasius Indus.,
Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (same).
224. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
225. Id. at 1281.
226. Id. at 1283.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1285.
229. Id. at 1287.
230. Id. at 1289.
231. Id. at 1287–88.
232. Id. at 1290–92.
233. Id. at 1291.
234. Id. at 1289–90.
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that defensive measure and allow a tender offer to proceed.235  The “no-
hand” provision was thus just as impermissible as a “dead-hand” one.236
C. Disclosure and Due Care
A significant case at the end of that era established that directors
could also violate their fiduciary duties by misrepresenting material facts
to shareholders to gain their approval for a merger.237  That can result in
courts scrutinizing the “entire fairness” of the transaction, losing directors
the presumptions of the business judgment rule and subjecting them to
monetary damages.238  The case, Emerald Partners v. Berlin,239 involved a
merger between May Petroleum Company (“May”) and thirteen corpora-
tions owned by one Hall.  At that time, Hall owned over half the stock of
May as well.240
The proxy statements sent to shareholders soliciting their approval
contained misstatements about the thoroughness of the merger process
and Hall’s holdings in some of the companies.241  The transaction was also
allegedly unfair to the minority shareholders of May because the price
paid for Hall’s companies was too high.242  The Chancery Court dismissed
the case against all of May’s directors except Hall because it found at most
235. Id. at 1290–93.
236. Id.  Three years later a North Carolina court stated its exasperation on
these issues.  First Union Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-10075, 2001 WL
1885686 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001).  It found Delaware’s various standards for
defensive tactics confusing and called for a “refocus on the relationship between
shareholder rights and directors duties to make informed decisions . . . .” Id. at
*17–18.  The court found support for that more straightforward position in an
article by the then Delaware Vice-Chancellor (now Chancellor). Id. at *19–20; see
also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock
Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919 (2001).  The North Carolina case itself in-
volved what the court called a “numb hand” provision in a merger contract that
extended it five months beyond a shareholder vote disapproving the deal. First
Union, 2001 WL 1885686, at *38.  The court struck it down because it violated the
duties of the target company’s directors and the rights of its shareholders. Id. at
*38–39.
237. See generally Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999).
238. See generally id.
239. 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999).  Partial disclosure can also be misleading.
Arnold v. Soc’y for Savings Bancorp, Inc. 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994).  A re-
cent study has shown that there is litigation in almost every acquisition of U.S.
public companies valued over $100 million.  These typically allege disclosure viola-
tions and many claim that the target’s board did not conduct a sales process to
maximize shareholder value. See Developments in M&A Shareholder Litigation, THE
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Mar. 4, 2012 8:58 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/04/developments-in-ma-share
holder-litigation/.
240. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1218.
241. Id. at 1222.
242. Id. at 1221.
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they had only breached their duty of care and could not be liable under
Section 102(b)(7).243
But dismissal was premature, said the Delaware Supreme Court; given
the substantial disclosure violations, the entire fairness of the transaction
had not been shown.244  Lacking that, the defendant directors had the
burden to show that they had only violated their duties of care and not
their duties of loyalty or good faith.245  When, on remand, the Chancery
Court still failed to make that finding, the Supreme Court again sent the
case back down holding that “exculpation must then be examined in the
context of the completed judicial analysis that resulted in a finding of
unfairness.”246
D. Locks Up and Go Shops in the 2000s
In several more merger cases during the last decade, the Delaware
Supreme Court continued to define the duties of directors to seek the best
value for their shareholders.247  One, Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,
Inc.,248 began with an offer by Omnicare for NCS, a struggling company.
NCS’s board turned it aside and found better merger terms from Gene-
sis.249  NCS’s directors then agreed to submit that bid to their sharehold-
ers regardless of whether a higher one came along.250  Two large
shareholder-directors of NCS who owned a majority of the stock in the
company also committed to vote their shares for the deal.251
Even when Omnicare came back with a better bid, NCS’s sharehold-
ers had no choice but to accept the Genesis merger.252  Without a “fiduci-
ary out”253 that would have allowed Omnicare’s directors to abrogate the
deal if they found a better one for their shareholders, the merger was a fait
accompli,254 both preclusive and coercive.  The court said that Omnicare’s
board had acted like the Paramount directors in QVC who breached their
duty with the “no-shop” provision with Viacom.255  Both boards had im-
243. Id. at 1223.  For additional discussion of Section 102(b)(7), see supra
notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
244. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223–24.
245. Id. at 1227.
246. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 98 (Del. 2001).
247. For a fine article exploring the nuances of that issue, see Christina M.
Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go Shops, 73 BROOK.
L. REV. 525 (2008).  For a good discussion of how boards can best satisfy that duty,
see Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729 (2008).
248. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
249. Id. at 924.
250. Id. at 925.
251. Id. at 943–45.
252. Id. at 927.
253. Id. at 936.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 937.
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properly prevented their shareholders from getting a superior bid.256
Two justices dissented.257
In re Topps Company Shareholders Litigation258 was also a situation where
the Court found that a target’s management engaged in a number of im-
proper activities to favor one bidder over another.  Among them, the di-
rectors solicited proxies for a merger with the favored suitor without
making full disclosure of an arrangement that would have allowed them to
remain in control of the company.259  They also appeared to be manipu-
lating the financial analysis in those documents to make the deal they were
recommending look more attractive.260
In addition, in exchange for furnishing a potential acquirer some
confidential information, the target’s management had secured a so-called
standstill agreement from that bidder that it would hold off making its
offer.261  By refusing to waive that provision, however, the court found
that the target’s management had breached its fiduciary duty to permit its
shareholders to entertain a better proposal and to receive useful informa-
tion that was critical of the deal favored by the board.262
In the last year of the decade, in a case called Lyondell Chemical Co. v.
Ryan,263 the Delaware Supreme Court once again came back to the Revlon
and Van Gorkom issues.  Upon careful analysis and with supportive outside
opinions, the board accepted an attractive merger offer that was ratified by
an overwhelming percentage of shareholders.264  A dissident claimed,
however, that unless the board could show it had “impeccable knowledge
of the market”265 it violated its Revlon duties and acted in bad faith by not
seek competing bids.
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, held that Revlon only re-
quired that directors use reasonable judgment to secure the best price for
the company.266  And the evidence in this case indicated that they did.267
They were aware of the value of their company, received an expert opin-
ion that the bidder had offered a “blowout” price, and even placed a “fidu-
ciary out” in the merger agreement in case a better offer came along.268
There was thus no “bad faith” or “breach of loyalty” in their action that
256. Id. at 931, 937.
257. Id. at 939.
258. 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
259. Id. at 88.
260. Id. at 76.
261. Id. at 83 n.20.
262. Id. at 92–93.
263. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
264. Id. at 239.
265. Id. at 243.
266. Id. at 240–41.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 244.
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would be unprotected from liability by the company’s Section 102(b)(7)
exculpatory clause.269
V. MERGERS AFTER THE MELTDOWN
A. More on Boards’ Duties to Maximize Value
As confidence began returning to the M&A market a few years after
the financial collapse of 2008, Delaware decisions appeared that added
new twists to that state’s law of fiduciary duty.270  In two significant cases,
the Chancery Court reached different results based on the disparate rela-
tionship the targets’ boards had with their shareholders.
In re OPENLANE, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.,271 involved a board that
actively managed its company and knew it well.  In addition, sixty-eight
percent of the firm’s stock was held by its officers and directors.272  As a
result of a lengthy search for potential acquirers, the company chose to
merge with KAR because it offered shareholders the best value.273  The
situation, however, almost seemed like a reprise of Omnicare, because the
merger agreement contained no “fiduciary out” and did not allow
OPENLANE to solicit other bids.274
Unlike that earlier case, however, the court did not find this arrange-
ment preclusive or coercive.275  Since OPENLANE’s board could termi-
nate the agreement if shareholder approval was not received in twenty-
four hours, the court held that the deal was not a fait accompli.276  The
active pre-merger market test also led the court to find that the arrange-
ment was well considered.277  That conclusion was additionally strength-
ened because the deal was approved by a knowledgeable board whose
holdings gave it a personal interest in maximizing shareholder value.278
Therefore, the court refused to block the merger, which would have de-
nied the shareholders the ability to profit by the transaction.279
In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. Shareholder Derivative Litigation280 con-
cerned an acquisition where the controlling shareholder’s interests were
269. Id. at 239.
270. Michael J. De La Merced & Jeffrey Cane, Confident Deal Makers Pulled Out
Checkbooks in 2010, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
01/03/confident-deal-makers-pull-out-checkbooks-in.
271. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
272. Id. at *7.
273. Id. at *11–13.
274. Id. at *9.
275. Id.
276. Id. at *12.
277. Id. at *5–6.
278. Id. at *16.
279. Id.
280. 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011), superseded by In re Southern Peru Copper
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 532 A.2d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011), vacated, No. 961-CS,
2011 WL 6476919 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011).
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not so well aligned with those of the other stockholders.  The questioned
transaction involved Southern Peru’s agreement to purchase another min-
ing company, Minerva, from Southern Peru’s majority owner, Grupo Mex-
ico.281  The deal had been proposed by Grupo and the sale price was to be
paid in Southern Peru shares.282  Because of that obvious conflict, South-
ern Peru formed a special committee to consider the offer.283  It was com-
prised of four directors who were independent from Grupo and
disinterested in the transaction.284  But a financial advisor retained by the
special committee to evaluate the offer raised a significant concern.285  It
found that under the terms proposed by Grupo it would get Southern
Peru stock worth substantially more than Minerva.286  Before the deal
closed Southern Peru’s stock rose even higher, making that price imbal-
ance even more lopsided in Grupo’s favor.287
Despite those facts, the special committee and Southern Peru’s share-
holders approved the Minerva purchase.288  When dissident stockholders
sued, Grupo’s conflict was obvious and the parties agreed the acquisition
had to be tested by the “entire fairness” standard.289  The court, however,
placed the burden to prove that on the defendants since the special com-
mittee, despite its independence, was not “well functioning.”290  It had no
authority to negotiate with Grupo or to investigate alternatives to its pro-
posal to sell Minerva to Southern Peru.291
In addition, one of the special committee members was potentially
compromised.292  He was employed by a fourteen percent stockholder of
Southern Peru that needed Grupo’s consent to register its Southern Peru
shares for public sale.293  The court also found that the shareholder vote
was not informed because the proxy materials failed to disclose questions
about Minerva’s value.294  With all that in the mix, the court could not be
convinced that the transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders of
Southern Peru.295  It ordered Grupo to pay Southern Peru over $1.3 bil-
281. Id. at 65–66.
282. Id. at 65.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 66.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 83.
288. Id. at 80.
289. Id. at 65.
290. Id. at 89.
291. Id. at 69.
292. Id. at 86.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 74–75.
295. Id. at 97.
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lion in damages—the difference between the market value of the shares
Southern Peru gave for Minerva and the true worth of that company.296
B. Another Look at the Pill
During the post-meltdown recovery, Delaware also had occasion to
revisit the poison pill, more than a quarter century after it first condoned
that most formidable and durable of defensive tactics.297  The opinion in
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,298 was written by a long-time
veteran of Delaware corporate litigation, Chancellor William Chandler,
shortly before he left the bench.
He saw the case as posing the ultimate issue of corporate govern-
ance—“the allocation of power between shareholders and directors.”299
“When, if ever, will a board’s duty to the corporation and shareholders
require it to abandon concern for long-term values (and other constituen-
cies) and enter a current share value maximizing mode?”300  The Chancel-
lor’s answer was that directors might have to do that at some point, but not
under the facts of the case before him, however compelling.301  Air Prod-
ucts had made a public tender for all of Airgas’s stock, ultimately raising
its bid to seventy dollars per share.302  With the support of several outside
opinions by financial experts, Airgas’s board held fast, maintaining that its
stock was worth at least seventy-eight dollars.303  When it refused to re-
move its pill, Air Products waged a proxy fight and was able to secure three
seats on Airgas’s staggered board.304  But then, surprisingly, even those
directors agreed with the remaining board members that Air Products’
offer was inadequate.305
The tender offer battle had gone on for over a year, longer than any
litigated poison pill in Delaware history, and Airgas’s shareholders were
fully told about its directors’ opinion on the inadequacy of Air Products’
bid.306  That led Chancellor Chandler to express his personal view that the
296. Id. at 120.  Legal fees awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys amounted to $285
million.  Tom Hals, Plaintiffs Attys in So Copper Case Get $285 Mln Fee, THOMSON
REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/
News/2011/12_-_December/Plaintiffs_attys_in_So_Copper_case_get_$285_mln_
fee/.
297. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
298. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
299. Id. at 54.
300. Air Products, 16 A.3d at 54.
301. Id. at 55.
302. Id. at 55–56.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 127.  The Chancellor used that as evidence that it was not impossi-
ble for Air Products to run a successful proxy contest, take over the company, and
redeem the pill.  The Delaware Supreme Court had recently found that an impor-
tant factor in upholding a pill. See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d.
586, 601–04 (Del. 2010).
305. Id. at 128.
306. Id. at 54.
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rights plan had served its purpose.307  Airgas’s directors, however, were
well informed and acted in good faith to prevent their shareholders from
tendering into an inadequate offer.308  Under prevailing precedent the
Chancellor therefore felt constrained to hold that Airgas’s directors were
still entitled to maintain the pill.309
C. Putting the Focus on Investment Banks
Large financial institutions typically act as advisors to both purchasers
and sellers in merger and acquisition transactions.  Traditionally their du-
ties are defined by contract.  One earlier case,310 however, where the bank
also acted as a financier of the deal, held that they might have fiduciary
duties in those situations as well.311  Two recent decisions involving major
Wall Street firms present a window on some of their continuing, unseemly
practices in these large corporate dealings.
The first, In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation,312 involved
the $5.3 billion leveraged buyout of Del Monte by a group of private eq-
uity firms led by Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (“KKR”).313  From this sale,
the shareholders of Del Monte would receive nineteen dollars per share in
cash, substantially more than the trading value of the company’s stock.314
Some stockholders, however, sought a preliminary injunction to stop the
deal alleging that Del Monte’s directors had failed to provide proper over-
sight of the company’s financial advisor, Barclays.315  The shareholders
claimed that because of Barclay’s double-dealing they had been prevented
from getting the best price for their stock.316
Barclays had been a long-time advisor to Del Monte.317  When it was
for sale, Barclay’s met with KKR and another private equity firm to en-
307. Id. at 57.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 57–58.
310. In re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 1996).
311. See M. Breen Haire, Comment, The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment
Bankers in Change-of-Control Transactions: In re Daisy System Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
277 (1999).  Additionally, in Weinberger v. UOP, there were allegations that an in-
vestment banker rendering a fairness opinion in a take-out merger breached its
fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders. See Carol B. Haight, Note, The Stan-
dard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out
Merger: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 98 (1983).
In the wake of the financial meltdown, Goldman Sachs paid a record fine for
engaging in conflicted transactions in the derivative market. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Litigation Release No. 21592, 2010 WL 2799362
(July 15, 2010) (announcing $550 million fine for Goldman Sachs).
312. 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
313. Id. at 817.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 826.
317. Id. at 817.
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courage them to make bids for the company.318  When the other firm
made the first bid, Del Monte hired Barclays to advise it.319  Barclays, how-
ever, did not tell Del Monte that it would profit from that purchase by
providing financing to the buyer.320
Barclays did represent to Del Monte that it was encouraging other
bids for the company (one of which was by KKR) and that it would secure
price competition in the process by not allowing buyers to team up in
their offers.321  At first, Del Monte’s board rejected all the offers that came
from those solicitations.322  But then several months later, Barclays again
worked with KKR and another firm that had originally outbid it for Del
Monte to produce a team bid for the company.323
Barclays and KKR then approached Del Monte with the new offer,
keeping their “team bid” a secret.324  When Del Monte then hired Barclays
as its financial advisor with the goal of getting the highest bid from KKR,
Barclays came back with what the court called “two unsavory requests.”325
Barclays, for the first time, asked Del Monte to allow KKR’s team bid with a
firm that might offer more for Del Monte on its own.326  Then Barclays
also asked if it could provide some of the financing for KKR even though
Del Monte and KKR had not yet agreed on a price and Barclays was sup-
posed to be getting the best price for Del Monte.327
Because of Barclays’s dual role, Del Monte had to pay another advisor
three million dollars for a fairness opinion on KKR’s offer.328  Then when
Del Monte provisionally accepted KKR’s bid, it engaged Barclays in an-
other conflicted role by having it solicit competing offers for forty-five
days.329  Not surprisingly, because Barclays would benefit by the KKR deal,
no other bids were forthcoming.330
The court found that Barclays, aided by KKR, “secretly and selfishly”
manipulated this sales process.331  It did not disclose its efforts to put Del
Monte in play, thereby allowing the bank to profit twice—both as the com-
pany’s advisor and as KKR’s financier.332  It compounded its disloyalty by
engineering KKR’s team offer that may have prevented Del Monte’s share-
318. Id. at 820.
319. Id. at 817.
320. Id. at 821.
321. Id. at 834–35.
322. Id. at 820–22.
323. Id. at 823–24.
324. Id. at 824–25.
325. Id. at 826.
326. Id. at 824–25.
327. Id. at 825–26.
328. Id. at 826.
329. Id. at 827.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 817.
332. Id.
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holders from getting more than they did by that collusive bidding.333  Be-
cause the company’s directors had a duty to maximize the value of Del
Monte for its shareholders, they should have better supervised this process
so that Barclays could not engage in its double-dealing.334  Even though
the court found that the directors were less culpable than Barclays because
Barclays had misled them, they had still breached their fiduciary duties to
the shareholders.335
Given Section 102(b)(7)’s provision allowing directors to be exoner-
ated from liability for mere breaches of their duty of care, the Vice-Chan-
cellor was unsure if the board could be held liable for monetary
damages.336  He did however enjoin the sale of Del Monte for twenty days
to see if any additional bidders would emerge who would top KKR’s of-
fer.337  None did and the merger took place.338  But despite the Vice-
Chancellor’s comments about the unlikelihood of monetary relief, Bar-
clays and Del Monte settled with the shareholders by paying $67 million in
damages after legal fees of over $20 million.339
The second case, In re El Paso Corp. Shareholder Litigation,340 also in-
volved perfidious conduct by an investment bank, Goldman Sachs, which
had been a long-time advisor of the target company.341  When Kinder
Morgan offered El Paso shareholders a package of stock and cash that was
a substantial premium over the market price of their shares, El Paso
sought advice from Goldman.342  El Paso knew that Goldman owned
nineteen percent of Kinder’s stock and had two seats on its board.343  The
leading Goldman banker advising El Paso, however, did not disclose to his
client that he personally owned $340,000 of Kinder stock.344
After a deal was negotiated and renegotiated between El Paso and
Kinder, Goldman advised El Paso to take it.345  El Paso’s board did, in-
stead of pursuing an earlier strategy of selling off one of its two divisions
that did exploration.346  Doug Foshee, El Paso’s CEO, negotiated the deal
with Kinder but he did not tell El Paso’s board that he wanted to lead a
333. Id.
334. Id. at 841–42.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 838.
337. Id. at 842–43.
338. See Del Monte Foods Stockholders Approve Merger Agreement (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://investors.delmonte.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=662563 (issuing
statement on approval of merger).
339. Michael J. De La Merced, Del Monte and Barclays Settle Investor Lawsuit for
$89.4 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at B7.
340. 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
341. Id. at 434.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 436.
346. Id. at 437–38.
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group to buy the company’s exploration business from Kinder after the
merger closed.347  Of course, that raised all kinds of questions about
whether Foshee was negotiating the best deal for El Paso’s shareholders or
was just taking a lesser amount from Kinder so that it would sell him the
exploration business for a favorable price.348
Goldman was also compromised in its advice to El Paso by its own
large stake in Kinder and the shares held by its lead partner.349  The bank
may have thus been willing to recommend a deal where Kinder paid a
suboptimum price for El Paso.350  That taint was hardly removed when
Goldman brought in Morgan Stanley as a supposedly neutral advisor, be-
cause Morgan Stanley only got paid its thirty-five million dollar fee if the
total Kinder deal got approved.351
In his review of the case, Chancellor Strine forcefully expressed his
disapproval of the conduct of both Goldman and Foshee saying “[t]he
kind of troubling behavior exemplified here can result in substantial
wealth shifts from stockholders to insiders that are hard for the litigation
system to police if stockholders continue to display a reluctance to ever
turn down a premium-generating deal when that is presented.”352
Yet unlike Del Monte, the Chancellor in El Paso refused to enjoin a
shareholder vote on the sale.353  He strangely did not even discuss the Del
Monte decision, which had occurred just a year earlier.  Instead he com-
mented that equitable remedies, such as injunctions, might not offer
much real protection to shareholders in situations like the El Paso
merger.354  In fact he stated his belief that they might actually make it
harder for them to sell their stock at a premium if they eventually frus-
trated a buyout.355
VI. DELAWARE’S M&A FIDUCIARY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Accountability for Corrupt Activities
“The rules in Equity vary with the length of the Chancellor’s foot,”
goes the hoary legal maxim.356  From an historic perspective, Delaware’s
apparent inconsistency on fiduciary duties may bear that out.  The small
state along the Atlantic seaboard was once thought to be a haven for dere-
347. Id. at 434.
348. Id. at 442.
349. Id. at 434.
350. Id. at 442.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 450.
353. Id. at 448.
354. Id. at 449–52.
355. Id. at 451–52.
356. Cf. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927) (“Equity is
a Roguish thing . . . .  ‘Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the
measure, we call a Foot, a Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain measure would this
be?”).
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lict corporate officials—letting them neglect their shareholders’ interests
with impunity.357
Then along came Guth358 and Sinclair359 establishing baseline obliga-
tions that insiders not steal business from their corporations and treat
their minority shareholders with a modicum of fairness. Van Gorkom,360
although modified by statute,361 issued a wake-up call to directors that
they must make informed, deliberate decisions on important corporate
matters.  Yet Delaware’s rulings on the fiduciary duties of directors do not
exhibit much of a thematic unity.  They might best be characterized as
episodic, ad hoc responses to flagrant corporate misconduct.
When it comes to mergers and acquisitions, whether friendly or hos-
tile, the Delaware courts have shown a propensity to step back and let
boards make those decisions.  This tolerance exists so long as manage-
ment is not ultimately disenfranchising its shareholders362 or blocking
them from profiting when their firm is up for sale.363  Yet if insiders and
their allies engage in self-dealing, enriching themselves unfairly at the ex-
pense of their shareholders and other corporate stakeholders, the Dela-
ware courts have progressively shown a willingness to intervene.  That
trend appears to be gaining momentum.  As two observers put it recently,
“[t]he year 2011’s most important corporate law decisions . . . included
significant victories in Delaware for investors asserting fiduciary duty
claims.”364  Following on that, the tongue lashing that Chancellor Strine
gave the El Paso insiders in early 2012 was a fitting rebuke for their deceit-
ful conduct.
“I’m glad somebody is cracking down on this corruption,” may seem
like an appropriate response.  With Madoff-like scams going undetected
for decades and the government’s weak prosecution of crimes from the
financial meltdown,365 it seems like the Chancery Court is at least one
place where corporate malefactors will have their day of reckoning.  Such
an effective tribunal is needed now more than ever.  As shown by Greg
Smith’s high profile protest against the greed and malfeasance in the fi-
nancial community, it appears deceitful conduct on Wall Street is now
worse than ever.366
357. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 64–78 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 219–36 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 179–203 and accompanying text.
364. See Paul D. Brown, supra note 28.
365. For the author’s take on these substantial short-comings in white collar
criminal prosecution, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. REV.
393, 398–405 (2010).
366. The recent $2 billion loss by J.P. Morgan in its derivative trading raised
new concerns about improvident and highly speculative practices on Wall Street.
It also may have violated various regulations requiring banks to hold sufficient
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So, of late, the Chancery Court in Delaware, spurred on by investor
advocates, has been doing something to keep the conscience of corporate
America.  Yet one could certainly wish for more.  They have made too
sparing use of that “strong arm of Equity,”367 the injunction.  As Chancel-
lor Strine lamented in El Paso, much of the wrongful activity in mergers
and acquisitions may never be stopped because shareholders are reluctant
to turn down deals, no matter how flawed, that give them a premium over
the market price of their stock.368  But the Chancellor and his colleagues
are themselves too indulgent of such wrongdoing by not permanently en-
joining those corrupt transactions for fear of depriving shareholders of
some temporary gain.  To extend President Theodore Roosevelt’s logic,369
shareholders are not innocent if by their greedy desire for short-term prof-
its they are passive accomplices to corrupt activity.
Damage suits may provide shareholders some remedy, but that mone-
tary relief rarely comes from the personal pockets of culpable corporate
officials.370  Instead it is usually paid from insurance purchased with share-
holder money to protect them from personal liability.  Because “[e]quity
delights to do justice and not by halves”371 the Delaware courts must
therefore give a fully effective remedy for this deceitful conduct.
To stop such corrupt activity dead in its tracks the courts should per-
manently enjoin any transactions brought about by secret double-dealing.
They would then be true to the historic origins of fiduciary jurisprudence
reserve capital.  Mark Scott, Regulators Looking into JP Morgan Trading Activities Before
$2 Billion Loss, DEALBOOK (May 11, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
05/11/regulators-looking-into-jpmorgan-trading-activities-before-2-billion-loss/.
For a fine recent article about the continued lack of transparency in Wall Street
Investment banks, see Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s
Banks?, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 60.  J.P. Morgan’s chairman Jamie Dimon has
admitted that his firm was “sloppy” and “stupid” in making those trades.  Yet J.P.
Morgan has spent $20 million over the last three years on lobbying and campaign
contributions urging less government regulation.  Dana Milbank, Banks Pay, Regu-
lations Suffer, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, May 24, 2012, at 13A.  Further news about Wall
Street improprieties has surfaced involving Facebook’s recent public offering.
Banks underwriting that IPO may have shared unfavorable information about the
company with a select group of clients.  Evelyn M. Rusli & Michael J. De La
Merced, Facebook Debut Raises Questions on I.P.O. Process, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012, at
A1.
367. See Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830)
(No. 1,617); see also JAMES L. HIGH, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 36 (4th
ed. 1905).
368. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
369. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensa-
tion and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 244
(2009) (“Nothing is sillier than this outcry on behalf of the ‘innocent sharehold-
ers’ in the corporations.” (citing 6 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 886 (Et-
ling E. Morrison et al. eds., 1952))).
370. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter-
rence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1549-51 (2006).
371. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND INCIDENTS
THEREOF 76 (8th ed. 1870).
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as it sprang from the law of trusts.  There, the “No Further Inquiry” doc-
trine makes all transactions where trustees have breached those duties
voidable regardless of whether the results are fair to their beneficiaries.372
It also levies meaningful sanctions against trustee self-dealing that includes
rescission, disgorgement of gain, and consequential damages.373  All those
are available as ancillary remedies in injunctive actions.374
If the Delaware courts, through their piecemeal approach, cannot ad-
equately police questionable M&A activity, sterner tribunals can be cre-
ated.  Two decades ago—at the end of the 1980s wave of mergers—this
author, among others, called for such reforms.375  To combat some of the
harmful financial excesses that surfaced during that era and continue to
this day, a national authority such as the SEC could be empowered to pre-
clear all M&A activity.
To that end, the Williams Act could be amended to add this addi-
tional provision: “It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase any
shares in a tender offer unless the Securities and Exchange Commission
finds that they are fair to the selling shareholders and in the public inter-
est.”  To make such adjudication fully-informed, all bidders for public
companies would have to file a “public impact statement” in advance de-
tailing the social and economic consequences of their acquisitions.
B. Revlon and the Business Judgment Rule
Air Products is the most recent evidence that Delaware will continue to
afford target management substantial latitude in opposing hostile take-
overs. Unocal does hold, however, that boards are not given carte blanche
authority there.376  Their actions must be reasonable and proportionate to
the threat.377  Yet the business judgment rule is available to give a board
considerable support in resisting a bid that can be deemed inadequate.378
On the other hand, “dead hand” or “no hand” provisions that pro-
hibit the removal of pill-like defenses will not be permitted.379  Target di-
rectors will also not be allowed to make sweetheart deals with certain
suitors that will allow them to remain in power at the expense of their
372. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b) (2000).
373. Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to
Professor John Langbein 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 543 (2005).
374. As one commentator put it: “[t]raditionally courts of equity have had the
power to shape full relief, taking into account the interests of the parties affected
and the goals to be pursued, once their jurisdiction is properly invoked.”  James R.
Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779,
1781 (1976) (citing 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 114–15,
181, 231, 236(a), 239(a) (5th ed. 1941)).
375. See Morrissey, supra note 12, at 82–84.
376. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 955–56.
379. See supra notes 219–36 and accompanying text.
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shareholders380 or to prematurely lock up transactions with favored
bidders.381
Most significantly Revlon comes into play when a company is effec-
tively put up for sale.  Management, in Justice Moore’s intriguing phrase,
cannot then keep defending “the corporate bastion.”382  Surrender is war-
ranted, one that will maximize value for the firm’s entrepreneurial risk-
takers, the shareholders.
The Revlon decision is puzzling, however, in several ways.  First, when
do its duties kick in?  In other words, what constitutes a Revlon event?
Change of control is the touchstone there—according to Paramount. Rev-
lon came into play there, the court said, because the new acquirer would
have a dominant shareholder.383  In Time however, there was no Revlon
event because after the merger control would remain fluid in publicly
held shares.384  Was that a significant difference?  Perhaps Warner’s re-
spect for Time’s journalistic integrity was the factor that influenced the
court sub rosa to allow Time’s board to favor it over Paramount.
Second, Revlon’s duty is to secure the best price for shareholders once
a company is on the auction block.  If part of the compensation, however,
is to be paid in securities whose value is dependent on the future success
of the new entity, as it was in QVC, doesn’t the board still have a role to
play?  Shouldn’t it be able to block a deal that it honestly believes will not
return the best value for its shareholders?385
Third, what is this heightened scrutiny that Revlon seems to demand
that goes beyond routine deference to the board’s business judgment?  In
Lyondell, the bidder came to the company with a very good offer that, with
appropriate advice, it accepted.386  Yet a disgruntled shareholder claimed
that the board should have sought competing bids unless it had perfect
knowledge that it was receiving top dollar for the firm.387  The Delaware
Supreme Court rejected that approach.388  With those facts, at least, the
court found no bad faith and was fine acceding to the board’s business
judgment.389
380. See supra notes 259 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text.
382. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986).
383. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del.
1994).
384. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del.
1990).
385. For a good analysis here, see GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at 716.
386. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238–39 (Del. 2009).
387. Id. at 239.
388. Id. at 242–43.
389. Id. at 244.
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR106.txt unknown Seq: 45 19-FEB-13 12:09
2013] M&A FIDUCIARY DUTIES 165
C. Fiduciaries for Whom?
Two decades ago Chancellor Allen identified the issue of “purpose” as
the fundamental question of corporate law.390  To answer it, he said, re-
quired much more than reference to a static set of legal rules.391  Corpo-
rate law, rather, comes from the shared insights of our common legal
culture that we continually recreate through interpretation.392
Conventional corporate wisdom once held that directors must run
their corporations primarily to make profit for their shareholders.  In the
hostile takeover era, that outlook re-emerged as an attractive antidote to
charges that management constituted an entrenched class, more con-
cerned about protecting its own privileged positions than putting their
firms’ resources to their most profitable uses.393  That still exercises a pow-
erful, if not predominant, influence in our system of free enterprise where
private capital funds businesses on the hope of getting the best possible
returns.
However, broader views also have popular support.  Communal and
team approaches see board duties in a larger context.  As two scholars put
it, directors are:
[A] mediating hierarchy overseeing team production. . . .  [T]he
“firm” can be understood as a nexus of firm-specific assets that
have been invested by a variety of groups, including most obvi-
ously shareholders, bondholders, managers, and employees.  The
board of directors acts as a fiduciary for the firm, meaning that it
seeks to maximize the total value of these combined economic
interests.394
For the last several decades, that outlook has been finding guarded
support in important opinions and comments by leading Delaware jurists.
First were the anti-takeover decisions of the 1980s, most famously Unocal
and Moran, where the court under Justice Moore’s leadership upheld de-
fenses against tender offer onslaughts by highly leveraged bidders such as
T. Boone Pickens.395
Next came the important remark by Chancellor Allen in Paramount,
embraced by the Delaware Supreme Court, that directors are not required
to manage their firms to maximize short-term profit.396  Also of signifi-
cance there may have been Time’s claim that Warner would be more re-
spectful of its journalistic integrity—indicating that companies have
390. See William T. Allen, supra note 143, at 262.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See generally supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
394. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediat-
ing Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 425 (2001).
395. Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
396. Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
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responsibilities to society beyond making the most money in the quickest
amount of time.397
Most recently we have the comments by two of Chancellor Allen’s suc-
cessors, William Chandler and Leo Strine,398 who have also acknowledged
those broader corporate duties.  Chancellor Strine, along with his co-au-
thors in their Georgetown piece, indicated that the duty of loyalty has
broad communal implications because the moral corporation is a neces-
sary ingredient in civil society.399  In Air Products, we also have Chancellor
Chandler’s parenthetical nod to the duties of directors to “constituents” as
well as shareholders.400  A further step to achieve that goal would be a
governmental review as discussed above of all M&A activity in public
companies.401
VII. CONCLUSION
The Delaware courts reflect the mixed feelings most Americans have
about our economic system.402  They understand that the basic capitalist
397. Id.; see supra note 379–82 and accompanying text.
398. The Delaware Chancery Court has been called the “center of the corpo-
rate universe,” and the Chancellor there has been compared to the Chief Justice of
the United States.  D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Fundamental Question,
21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 577 (1998) (citing Firms Watch Change at Top of Del.
Court, BALT. SUN, Mar. 3, 1997, at 10C).
399. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPO-
RATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004).
400. Air Products & Chems. Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54 (Del. Ch.
2011). But see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (ruling that directors owe their fiduciary duties to share-
holders only, not creditors, when a corporation is in the “zone of insolvency”).
Although neither one is part of its Corporate Code, two types of laws passed by
other states may have influenced Delaware’s judicial decisions: anti-takeover and
constituent statutes.  In the first, states regulate takeovers for their corporations by
a number of means.  A popular one, the control share statute, prohibits a bidder not
approved by the target board from voting its newly acquired shares without a
favorable vote of the remaining shareholders.  The U.S. Supreme Court found that
constitutional.  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).  In the second,
directors are empowered to consider the effects of their actions on a number of
stakeholders in the firm such as employees, suppliers, customers, and communities
where the businesses are located.  Typical is Section 5/8.85 of the Illinois Business
Corporation Act. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1983).  Just in the last couple of
years some states have enacted legislation allowing the incorporation of so-called
“Benefit” corporations.  In addition to making profit, they explicitly acknowledge
that they have other purposes as well such as making a positive impact on society
and the environment. See generally Rakhi I. Patel, Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest Max-
imization: Accommodating Beneficial Corporations in the Model Business Corporation Act,
23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (2010); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A
Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011).
401. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
402. As one leading academic has put it: “[t]he modern American business
corporation has been a subject of wonder and horror for much of the past cen-
tury.” LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EX-
PORT 1 (2001).
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rules of our society have generally served us well.  When businesses are
operated for profit they are the most productive and furnish the goods
and services that assure our material well-being.403  Yet noted social philos-
ophers like Michael Sandal point out what moral thinkers have long main-
tained: maximum material prosperity is not an absolute value—
particularly if it is not evenly shared.404  Short-termism in business, as in
the rest of human relationships, can have devastating costs.405  In a civi-
lized society, the “creative destruction” of capitalism and its “animal spir-
its” must be tempered.
Delaware’s language about fiduciary duties displays the best in the
equitable tradition—a balancing of concerns,406 a moral dimension,407
and a fact-sensitive decision-making process.408  Yet their decisions often
come up short with murky distinctions, lacking the real bite of permanent
injunctions or heavy monetary damages.  If Delaware courts are going to
hold the trust of the American community in regulating corporate con-
duct they still have work to do.  If they cannot assume that responsibility,
other measures as outlined in this Article will be necessary.
403. Even Professor Bakan calls the corporation “a remarkably efficient
wealth-creating machine.”  See BAKAN, supra note 399.
404. See supra note 356–75 and accompanying text.
405. STOUT, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
406. Because of Equity’s need for discretion in administering its particular
brand of justice, the chancellor never considered himself bound by precedent like
common law judges. F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 8 (2d ed.
1949).
407. Because early chancellors had to be members of the medieval literary
class, they were most often clergymen.  Such persons might be deemed best able to
advise the king about matters of conscience. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS 61 (2d ed. 1984).
408. Equity always offered flexible remedies particularized to the situation of
the actual parties before them. See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S
CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1990).
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